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The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is the largest federal antipoverty program
in the United States and garners almost universal bipartisan support from politi-
cians, legal scholars, and other commentators. However, assessments of the EITC
missed an imperative perspective: that of EITC recipients themselves. Past work
relies on largely unconfirmed assumptions about the behaviors and needs of low-
income families. This Article provides a novel assessment of the EITC based on
original data obtained directly from 194 EITC recipients through in-depth qualita-
tive interviews. The findings are troubling: They show that while the EITC has
important advantages over welfare, which it has largely replaced, it fails as a safety
net for low-income families. The problem is that the EITC provides a large windfall
to families only once per year, during tax refund season. However, low-income
families are particularly vulnerable to financial shocks and instability. Not
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surprisingly, such events rarely coincide with tax refund season. Without a fix, the
EITC leaves many families on the brink of financial collapse. In the years to come,
many more low-income families may file for bankruptcy or become homeless.
Despite this grim outlook, this Article suggests a straightforward and promising
new way to distribute the EITC that maintains the program’s advantages while also
providing a more secure safety net for low-income families in times of financial
shock and instability.
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INTRODUCTION
The economic insecurity of American families is the highest it has
been in the past twenty-five years.1 Between 2008 and 2010, one in
five Americans experienced a 25% or greater decline in household
income, “yet lacked enough financial resources to cope with the
decline.”2 The slow recovery from the financial crisis of 20083 has
1 This Article uses Jacob Hacker’s definition of “economic insecurity,” which has two
components: “The ‘insecure’ are those whose available income declines by at least 25 per-
cent from one year to the next (after adjusting for inflation) . . . and who lack an adequate
financial safety net.” JACOB S. HACKER ET AL., ECON. SECURITY INDEX, ECONOMIC
SECURITY AT RISK: FINDINGS FROM THE ECONOMIC SECURITY INDEX, at 5 (2010)[herein-
after HACKER ET AL., ECONOMIC SECURITY AT RISK], available at http://www.rockefeller
foundation.org/news/publications/more-americans-are-financially-insecure.
2 JACOB S. HACKER ET AL., ECON. SECURITY INDEX, ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE
GREAT RECESSION: FINDINGS FROM THE ECONOMIC SECURITY INDEX, at 1 (2011) [herein-
after HACKER ET AL., THE GREAT RECESSION], available at http://economicsecurityindex.
org/assets/ESI%20Full%20Report%202011.pdf.
3 See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the 2012 National Association of Home Builders International Builders’ Show
(Feb. 10, 2012), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110210a.htm
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certainly contributed to this problem, but economic insecurity has
been growing for some time.4 Additionally, in the 1980s, the risk of an
American in his or her forties spending one year below the poverty
line was 13%; by the 1990s, this risk grew to 36%.5
While insecurity has increased for all Americans,6 levels of inse-
curity are higher among those with low incomes,7 those with limited
education,8 racial minorities,9 young workers,10 and single parents.11
This increase in insecurity means that more Americans qualify for and
seek financial help from the public safety net.12 As the demand for
government support increases, the debate about the adequacy of the
safety net for low-income families has taken center stage politically.13
Some argue that the safety net for low-income14 workers is strong15
(noting that while “some progress has been made in reversing the losses in jobs and income
sustained during the recession, the pace of expansion has been frustratingly slow and the
unemployment rate remains very high by historical standards”); Aki Ito, Fed Says
Rebound After Bank Crisis Slower than Average Recovery, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 2012,
1:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-16/fed-says-rebound-after-bank-crisis-
slower-than-average-recovery.html (describing a report by the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco which predicted that recovery from the 2008 crisis would be slower than
during the period following World War II).
4 See HACKER ET AL., THE GREAT RECESSION, supra note 2, at 1; HACKER ET AL.,
ECONOMIC SECURITY AT RISK, supra note 1, at iii (“In 1985, the unemployment rate was
7.2%, and the [risk of economic insecurity] was 12%. In 2002, the unemployment rate was
5.8%, but the [risk of economic insecurity] rose to 17%.”).
5 KATHERINE S. NEWMAN & VICTOR TAN CHEN, THE MISSING CLASS: PORTRAITS OF
THE NEAR POOR IN AMERICA 178 (2007).
6 See id. at iv (“Virtually all groups . . . [have] experienced significant increases in
insecurity over the past 25 years.”). Hacker also notes that “while less-educated and poorer
Americans have less stable family incomes than their better-educated and wealthier peers,
the increase in family income volatility affects all major demographic and economic
groups.” Jacob S. Hacker, The Middle Class at Risk, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS
THE MIDDLE CLASS 218, 224 (Katherine Porter ed., 2012).
7 See HACKER ET AL., ECONOMIC SECURITY AT RISK, supra note 1, at iv (noting that
the amount of insecurity varies across the population and that the less affluent face the
most insecurity); Lily L. Batchelder, Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 397 (2003) (“[L]ow-income families experience higher income
volatility from year to year than middle- and high-income families . . . .”).
8 HACKER ET AL., THE GREAT RECESSION, supra note 2, at 2.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 16–17.
12 See generally JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE ASSAULT ON
AMERICAN JOBS, FAMILIES, HEALTH CARE, AND RETIREMENT AND HOW YOU CAN FIGHT
BACK (2006) [hereinafter HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT] (describing increased
demands on public social programs due to increased economic insecurity).
13 One central concern is that “public social programs have eroded even as the
demands on them have risen. And if critics have their way, these programs will erode even
further.” Id. at 8.
14 In this Article, I describe families as both poor and low-income. I use “low-income”
when describing Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) recipients because not all EITC recipi-
ents are poor, as defined by the federal poverty line. I use “poor” when I discuss families
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(even too strong),16 while others argue that more resources are
needed.17
At the heart of the public safety net is the Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC),18 which is the United States’ “largest cash-transfer
program for low-income workers with children”19 and which has been
called the “largest federal anti-poverty program.”20 When the EITC
was implemented in 1975, it reached only 6.2 million recipients and
provided $1.25 billion in credits.21 By 2011, it served almost 26.8 mil-
lion recipients (compared to just over 1.8 million families serviced by
welfare in 2011)22 who received $59.5 billion.23 From 1995 to 2009, the
who were or are on welfare (as they must have been below the federal poverty line to
qualify); they often cannot be defined as “low-income” since they sometimes do not have a
worker in the household, so their income would be zero but for government benefit
programs.
15 E.g., Rachel Weiner, Romney, Citing Safety Net, Says He’s ‘Not Concerned About the
Very Poor,’ WASH. POST BLOG (Feb. 1, 2012, 8:18 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-fix/post/romney-im-not-concerned-with-the-very-poor/2012/02/01/gIQAvajShQ_
blog.html (“‘I’m not concerned about the very poor. We have a safety net there,’ Romney
told CNN.”).
16 See, e.g., David M. Drucker, DeMint Calls on Romney to Reframe Comments on
Poor, ROLL CALL (Feb. 1, 2012, 2:28 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/demint_calls_on_
romney_to_reframe_comments_on_poor-212035-1.html (claiming that “the poor . . . are
trapped in dependency . . . [and] don’t need to be on social welfare programs” and arguing
that safety net programs “are hurting, not just the poor, but our country”); Michael
McAuliff, House GOP Budget: Paul Ryan Plan Adds Food Stamps, Welfare Cuts to
Medicare-Slashing Plan, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 20, 2012, 7:35 AM), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/20/house-gop-budget-plan_n_1366455.html (last updated Mar.
21, 2012, 7:40 AM) (“We don’t want to turn the safety net into a hammock that lulls able-
bodied people . . . into complacency and dependence.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
17 See, e.g., HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra note 12, at 9 (“What we need are
new ways of allowing families to save and insure against some of the most potent risks to
their income, coupled with new ideas for revitalizing American social insurance and pro-
viding economic opportunity to all.”).
18 See Anne L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-
Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 533 (1995) [hereinafter Alstott,
Limitations] (“The federal [E]arned [I]ncome [T]ax [C]redit (EITC) . . . has recently
assumed a central role in U.S. social welfare policy.”); see also Marisol Bello, Romney
Remark Puts Focus on Safety Net for Very Poor, USA TODAY, Feb. 3, 2012, at A4, avail-
able at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politics/story/2012-02-02/romney-safety-net-poor/52
939822/1 (noting that the EITC is one of America’s strongest safety net programs).
19 Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 73 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 285, 285 (2010) [hereinafter Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay].
20 Lawrence Zelenak, Redesigning the Earned Income Tax Credit as a Family-Size
Adjustment to the Minimum Wage, 57 TAX L. REV. 301, 301 (2004).
21 ALAN BERUBE, BROOKINGS INST., USING THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT TO
STIMULATE LOCAL ECONOMIES 2 (2006), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/
reports/2006/11/childrenfamilies-berube/berube20061101eitc.pdf.
22 Fiscal and Calendar Year 2011—TANF: Total Number of Families, OFFICE OF
FAMILY ASSISTANCE (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/
caseload/2011/2011_family_tan.htm.
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EITC distributed more funds to recipients than the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP),24 and by 2001, the EITC dis-
tributed more funds than the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF) program (referred to herein as “welfare”).25 The EITC has
taken a more prominent role in the financial lives of low-income fami-
lies as more families qualify for it,26 and the debate has intensified
about the structure and utility of the EITC as a safety net.27 One of
the challenges for scholars evaluating the EITC is that Congress pro-
vided almost no legislative history indicating its intent for the pro-
gram.28 However, for the most part, scholars and commentators on
both sides of the political spectrum support the EITC,29 and most calls
for reform focus on increasing subsidies for specific types of families.30
23 EITC Statistics, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.eitc.irs.gov/central/eitcstats
(last updated Jan. 23, 2012).
24 This federal food assistance program was formerly known as the Food Stamp
Program.
25 Ruby Mendenhall et al., The Role of Earned Income Tax Credit in the Budgets of
Low-Income Families, 86 SOC. SERV. REV. 367, 368 (2012).
26 The 2010 tax year marked the highest claim rate since the EITC was enacted in the
1970s. In the fiscal year 2010 tax year, nearly one in every five filers claimed the EITC,
which “represents an increase of almost three million tax filers (a 12 percent gain) since the
start of the recession in 2008, and a 20 percent jump (almost $10 billion) in dollars
claimed.” Elizabeth Kneebone, EITC Receipt Continues to Rise in Recession’s Wake, NEW
REPUBLIC (Apr. 17, 2010, 12:41 PM), http://www.tnr.com/blog/the-avenue/102731/eitc-
receipt-continues-rise-in-recessions-wake.
27 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING
AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 54, 296–97 (1999) (arguing that the moral hazard problem
associated with the EITC is substantial, and thus that targeted subsidies for certain necessi-
ties and identifiable events are a better option than generally raising EITC subsidies);
Alstott, Limitations, supra note 18, at 535 (arguing that the tax system has institutional
constraints that hinder its administration of transfer programs such as the EITC);
Batchelder, supra note 7, at 397 (arguing that averaging the amount of money individuals
get from the EITC over a two-year period would better serve the needs of low-income
individuals and would mitigate the disproportionate burden of annual income taxation on
low-income families); David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and
Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 1023–25 (2004) (concluding that there are benefits
to administering the EITC through the tax system); Zelenak, supra note 20, at 302 (arguing
that the EITC should be redesigned as an adjustment to the minimum wage that ensures
that all families with a working parent will live above the poverty line, regardless of how
many children they have).
28 Zelenak, supra note 20, at 301.
29 See JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME WELFARE, IGNORE
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 81 (2007) (noting bipartisan praise for the EITC); Alstott, Why
the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 19, at 285 (noting widespread support for
the EITC).
30 See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 223 (1996) (advo-
cating for the expansion of the EITC to lift all full-time working-poor families out of pov-
erty); Janet McCubbin, Noncompliance with the Earned Income Tax Credit: The
Determinants of the Misreporting of Children, in MAKING WORK PAY: THE EARNED
INCOME TAX CREDIT AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICA’S FAMILIES 237, 237–73 (Bruce D.
Meyer & Douglas Holtz-Eakin eds., 2001) (examining noncompliance with the rules of the
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The current calls for reform, however, are missing an important per-
spective: that of EITC recipients themselves. Past scholarship relies on
largely unconfirmed assumptions about the behaviors and needs of
low-income families.31
In this Article, I provide a novel assessment of the EITC based
on empirical data obtained directly from EITC recipients through in-
depth interviews.32 Along with a team of researchers,33 I conducted
EITC and considering reforms to improve compliance); Zelenak, supra note 20, at 302
(“[T]he Article’s claim is that the EITC can and should be revised to function as an adjust-
ment to the minimum wage based on family size . . . .”); JASON FURMAN, CTR. ON BUDGET
& POL’Y PRIORITIES, TAX REFORM AND POVERTY 2 (2006), http://www.cbpp.org/files/4-10-
06tax.pdf (proposing to expand the EITC for larger families and for those without chil-
dren); JOHN KARL SCHOLZ, BROOKINGS INST., EMPLOYMENT-BASED TAX CREDITS FOR
LOW-SKILLED WORKERS (2007), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/
2007/12/12%20taxcredit%20scholz/12_taxcredit_scholz (advocating an increased EITC for
the childless and exploring its effects on work, crime, and marriage). But see Alstott,
Limitations, supra note 18, at 534–35 (arguing that the debate about the EITC has been
oversimplified and there are inherent institutional constraints present in the tax system
that do not exist in traditional welfare programs); Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make
Work Pay, supra note 19, at 312 (“[T]he EITC does not make . . . a large reduction in
poverty, . . . [allow] a minimum-wage worker to support . . . [her] child at a socially decent
minimum, . . . [or] ensure a decent minimum standard of living for willing workers who
suffer [emergencies that make them unable to work].”).
31 I do not argue that the EITC or any other public benefit program should be designed
based solely on the desires of those it serves. This would lead to conflict and potentially
faulty policy. Instead I suggest that, by talking directly to EITC recipients, we can better
understand how and why they make certain financial decisions and what some of the unin-
tended consequences of the program have been. This information, in turn, can allow us to
design more targeted and effective policy. See infra Part V.B (describing in greater detail
specific proposals for reform).
32 In-depth interviews are a standard research technique in qualitative studies in the
social sciences. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991) (using a
combination of interviews and ethnography of cattle farmers in a county in California to
challenge the assumptions of the Coase Theorem and to put forth a new theory of social
norms and order); Mario Luis Small, ‘How Many Cases Do I Need?’: On Science and the
Logic of Case Selection in Field-Based Research, 10 ETHNOGRAPHY 5, 11 (2009) (using
qualitative methods to gather data and using both qualitative and quantitative methods of
analysis). Several important studies in legal scholarship have been conducted using qualita-
tive methods. See, e.g., Catherine R. Albiston, Bargaining in the Shadow of Social
Institutions: Competing Discourses and Social Change in Workplace Mobilization of Civil
Rights, 39 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 11 (2005) (drawing on twenty-four interviews with workers
who negotiated contested leaves under the Family and Medical Leave Act to examine how
social institutions influence workplace mobilization of rights under the Act, how rights
under the Act operate in practice, and how rights under the Act interact with other norma-
tive systems to construct the meaning of leave); Lauren B. Edelman, Howard S. Erlanger
& John Lande, Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the
Workplace, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 497 (1993) (utilizing semi-structured, in-depth inter-
views to examine businesses’ internal complaint handlers’ conceptions of civil rights law
and the implications of those conceptions for their approach to dispute resolution); Angela
K. Littwin, Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit-Card Use and Preference Among Low-Income
Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451 (2008) (interviewing fifty low-income women about their
experiences and preferences for usury regulations, and then using her findings and the
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interviews that averaged two hours and thirty minutes in length with
194 families who received the EITC in 2007. Based on an analysis of
this data, I find that the EITC has important advantages over wel-
fare,34 but that in its current form, it fails as a safety net for families. I
argue for a new way of distributing the EITC that maintains its advan-
tages for low-income families, while also providing more support for
families in times of financial shock35 and instability.
The advantages of the EITC are clear. First, respondents were
overwhelmingly positive about the EITC and preferred it to welfare.
Respondents indicated that the EITC program motivates them to
work and gives them a sense of pride in receiving a tax refund based
on their work. The EITC also allows recipients a way to save, work
suggestions of the women to advocate for modifications to credit cards that could serve the
needs of both low-income women and creditors); Stewart Macaulay, Lawyers and
Consumer Protection Laws, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 115 (1979) (interviewing one hundred
lawyers in Wisconsin to better understand the impact of consumer protection laws, finding
that lawyers tend to know little about the precise aspects of consumer protection law and
instead rely on general norms of fairness and incentives for themselves when handling
cases, and discussing the implications of these findings for changes in the law); Ronald J.
Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1997) (utilizing
interviews with more than twenty borrowers and lenders in various sectors of the economy
to better understand how borrowers and lenders decide whether to engage in a secured or
unsecured transaction); Calvin Morrill, Lauren B. Edelman, Karolyn Tyson & Richard
Arum, Legal Mobilization in Schools: The Paradox of Rights and Race Among Youth, 44
LAW & SOC’Y REV. 651 (2010) (utilizing both quantitative methods and qualitative inter-
views to analyze ethnoracial patterns in youth perceptions and responses to rights viola-
tions and to advance a new model of legal mobilization).
Qualitative research is particularly useful in “explor[ing] micro-social phenomena . . .
[and] the cultural understandings actors bring to social experience, interactions, and insti-
tutions.” MICHELE LAMONT & PATRICIA WHITE, NAT’L SCI. FOUND., WORKSHOP ON
INTERDISCIPLINARY STANDARDS FOR SYSTEMIC QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 10 (2005), avail-
able at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/ses/soc/ISSQR_workshop_rpt.pdf. Further, qualitative
methods are useful for “unraveling the mechanisms underlying causal processes.” Id.
Qualitative research also allows scholars to understand and gather data within social con-
texts in a way that traditional surveys do not. Id. For further discussion of the value of
qualitative research, see infra note 54–57 and accompanying text.
33 Principal investigators included Kathryn Edin of Harvard University, Jeffrey Kling
of the Congressional Budget Office and the National Bureau of Economic Research, and
Ruby Mendenhall of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The project was gen-
erously funded by the Ford Foundation. As is common with large-scale data projects, the
data from this project have been (and continue to be) analyzed and used by several
researchers involved in the project for multiple publications, each of which has a different
focus. The unique focus of this Article is (1) evaluating the utility of the EITC as a safety
net for families who experience financial shocks; (2) exploring how families cope with such
shocks in the new, post–welfare reform era; and (3) proposing changes to the EITC to
better help families cope with financial shocks in the context of a shrinking public safety
net.
34 For a discussion of the advantages of the EITC as described by recipients, see infra
Part III.
35 See infra note 52 for a description of a financial shock for the purposes of this study.
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toward mobility goals, and avoid the stigma associated with other
public welfare programs.
The problem is that low-income families are particularly vulner-
able to financial shock events that can lead to job disruption.36 When
families experience these shock events, they find that the safety net
protecting them is thin and often unravels. Since recipients only
receive the EITC once per year, it does little to help them weather
these events. Welfare has become difficult to obtain and is stigma-
tized,37 so the majority of low-income families turn to what has
become the private safety net—credit cards—when shock events
occur. Thus, by the time they receive the EITC during tax refund
season, a significant portion of the refund must be used to pay off
credit card interest and fees at the expense of savings and mobility.
Families find themselves in an unmanageable and inescapable cycle of
debt accumulation, potentially leading to bankruptcy. For families
who do not have credit cards, shock events often result in immediate
dire consequences including homelessness and hunger.
I argue that the EITC can be redesigned to provide a more robust
safety net by offering a new program of distribution and withholding.
Under this program, 20% of recipients’ EITC refunds would be with-
held in interest-bearing accounts that I call Savings and Emergency
Fund (SAEF) accounts. Recipients would receive SAEF cards, which
would function much like debit cards, allowing recipients fast access to
the money in their SAEF accounts. Incentives such as annual bonuses
based on the percentage of money left in the account at the end of the
year would encourage use of the funds for emergencies only. This pro-
gram goes beyond the usual recommendations of doing away with the
EITC entirely or increasing the refund amount received by families.
Part I explains the study’s data and methodology. Part II dis-
cusses in more detail how the EITC has largely replaced welfare as
the main safety net for low-income families. I discuss the history of
this change and the key differences between welfare and the EITC.
Part III discusses the data from the study and surveys the assets of the
EITC program, offering the unique perspective of the recipients. My
interview data, consisting of in-depth qualitative interviews with a
large number of respondents, shed new light on the experiences of
low-income families with the EITC and the safety net needs of these
families. In Part IV, I show that, though the EITC is popular among
36 Alstott argues that one of the reasons the EITC does not ensure a minimum decent
standard of living for willing low-income workers is that such workers are more susceptible
to job disruptions due to unemployment, disability, and emergencies. See Alstott, Why the
EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 19, at 308, 312.
37 See discussion infra Part III.
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commentators and recipients, financial shocks have made this a dan-
gerous time for low-income families. The public safety net is broken
and has been replaced by credit cards, putting many families at risk. In
Part V, I discuss existing proposals for change that may address some
of the problems EITC recipients face when they experience financial
shocks. In Part VI, I propose a new method of EITC distribution and
withholding through SAEF accounts and cards as a means of main-
taining the advantages of the EITC while securing the safety net for
low-income families. I conclude by arguing that in these times of
increased economic insecurity, a program such as SAEF will help pre-
vent many low-income families from experiencing financial ruin when
they suffer a shock event.
I
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A. Sample Selection
This study took place in two locations: Boston, Massachusetts,
and the Champaign-Urbana metropolitan area in Illinois.38 The first
phase of the study began in late January 2007, with a research team
visiting selected non-profit and for-profit tax preparation sites in
Boston and the Champaign-Urbana area at random sampling inter-
vals. Using tract-level census data, the team selected sites based on the
racial, ethnic, and economic composition of the neighborhoods they
served.39 In mid-April, the team also began sampling at area Head
Start centers40 to ensure that it captured some respondents who filed
38 While the minimum wage across these two sites does not vary much ($7.75 in Illinois
versus $8.00 in Massachusetts), living costs do vary significantly by city. This presumably
affects households’ ability to make ends meet from month to month, as well as to save,
weather unexpected financial shock events, and build assets. Sites were selected so as to
reflect some of the considerable contrast in living costs across U.S. cities, with Boston well
above average and Champaign-Urbana somewhat below average. In 2010, Boston rated
132.5 on the composite index of the national Cost of Living Index and 152.7 in the housing
category of the Index. Champaign-Urbana, on the other hand, rated 96.9 composite and
90.8 for housing. The Cost of Living Index measures the relative price levels for consumer
goods and services for a “mid-management standard of living.” The nationwide average
equals 100, and each index is read as a percentage of the national average. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 478–79 tbl.728 (2012), available
at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/prices/consumer_price_indexes_cost_of_
living_index.html.
39 We sought a balance of sites located in lower-income White and Black neighbor-
hoods of the Champaign-Urbana area, and White, Black, and Latino areas of Boston.
40 We sampled at Head Start centers because a family must be low-income to qualify
for Head Start. Thus, sampling at Head Start centers allowed us to sample families who
likely received the EITC and met the sampling criterion of having a child.
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their taxes themselves, since roughly 30% of all EITC filers do not use
tax preparers.41
The research team asked anyone at these sampling sites who
claimed the EITC to participate in a short survey that focused on
planned uses of their refund.42 The team asked all respondents with
dependent children who said they expected to receive a tax refund of
at least $1000 to give consent for further contact.43 Overall, 657 of
those surveyed fit these criteria.
In the second phase of data collection, which began approxi-
mately six months after the initial survey, the team began contacting
families for in-depth interviews. We selected a stratified random
sample of survey respondents who met the initial sampling criteria.44
The sample was stratified by city (seventy-nine interviews in
Champaign-Urbana and 115 in Boston); by race/ethnicity (even num-
bers of White and Black households in Champaign-Urbana and even
numbers of White, Black, and Latino households in Boston); and by
family structure (within each city and racial and ethnic subgroup, the
team sampled two-thirds who had filed as single household heads and
one-third who had filed as married).
Both phases of sampling had very high response rates. For the
initial survey phase, I estimate that the response rate exceeded 95%.
Of those invited to participate in the in-depth interview in phase two,
all agreed to be interviewed except seven in Champaign-Urbana (four
from the for-profit and non-profit sites, and three from Head Start)
and nine in Boston (five of these refusals came from the two for-profit
41 Mendenhall et al., supra note 25, at 377.
42 Potential respondents were offered $10 to fill out the survey.
43 Imposing the $1000 criteria insured that the sample represented families who had
some meaningful potential opportunity for savings and asset building through their tax
refunds.
44 The sample was diverse. See Appendix A for a chart of demographics. Black families
represented 35% of the Boston sample and 58% of the Champaign-Urbana sample. White
families made up 35% of the families interviewed in Boston and 42% of the families in
Champaign-Urbana. Latino families, which were 30% of the Boston sample, were only
included in Boston due to their small numbers in Champaign-Urbana. Families with mar-
ried adults represented 39% of the Boston sample and 43% of the Champaign-Urbana
sample. Average family size in both cities included two children. About 60% of respondent
families in Boston lived in public or subsidized housing. Only 10% owned their own
homes. Champaign-Urbana respondents were more diverse in terms of home ownership,
with 44% of families renting at fair market value, 18% in public or subsidized housing, and
20% owning their homes. About half of respondent families in both cities worked full-
time; 17% of families in the Boston sample and 25% in the Champaign-Urbana sample
combine full-time and part-time work. In terms of TANF status, 10% of Boston respon-
dent families received assistance versus 1% of Champaign-Urbana families.
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sites, one from a non-profit site, and three from Head Start).45 Thus,
in this phase, the response rate was over 90%. Ultimately, six house-
holds were not eligible for the study, either because the interview
revealed they had not, in fact, received the EITC or because their
refund amount did not exceed $1000. This resulted in a final sample of
194 families.46
Overall, 36% of the intensive interview sample was drawn from
for-profit tax sites, 20% from non-profit sites, and 36% from Head
Start centers. Additionally, 7% of the sample was recruited via refer-
rals from other respondents and 1% from an online advertisement.
Nearly two-thirds (62%) of respondents used a for-profit tax preparer
to file their taxes, 24% relied on a non-profit preparer, and 14% filed
their own taxes or elicited the help of a family member or friend.
B. Data Collection
The team began conducting interviews47 about six months after
families received their refunds. We conducted in-depth, semi-
structured interviews in person with the head of household or, in the
case of married couples, with the parent in charge of the household’s
finances. Over 90% of interviews took place in respondents’ homes;
the remaining 10% took place in public locations such as parks, res-
taurants, or community centers. Interviews averaged two hours and
thirty minutes in length and ranged from ninety minutes to nearly five
hours. Respondents received $60 for their time. If the interview ran
substantially longer, interviewers offered additional money to further
compensate the respondent.
Interviewers developed a rapport with respondents, both through
initial “small talk” and by asking a series of “warm-up” questions.48 It
45 This does not include families that we could not contact for the follow-up interviews,
usually because they had moved.
46 For an in-depth analysis of qualitative sampling techniques and small versus large
samples, see LAMONT & WHITE, supra note 32, at 11–12.
47 Every interviewer had one of his or her first interviews attended by and evaluated by
a senior interviewer or principal investigator. Additionally, each interviewer attended at
least one interview conducted by another interviewer. After these initial observations, gen-
erally only one interviewer attended each interview. However, when there appeared to be
a significant childcare issue, a second interviewer attended and entertained the children to
ensure that the respondent was able to focus fully on the interview.
48 All interviewers attended a one-week qualitative training session by one of the prin-
cipal investigators, Dr. Kathryn Edin. Dr. Edin is a professor of public policy and manage-
ment at Harvard University, and she is nationally known for her use of qualitative methods
to develop deeper understanding into how low-income parents make decisions, including
decisions about marriage, childbearing, and expenditures. See generally KATHRYN EDIN &
MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD
BEFORE MARRIAGE (2005) (exploring some of the trends that drive the unintended
pregnancies of unmarried women by gathering and analyzing qualitative, long-form
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was not uncommon for respondents to ask interviewers to stay for
dinner, to break down crying when discussing a particularly sensitive
issue, or to offer to give the interviewer a tour of the respondent’s
house or neighborhood. All respondents signed a consent form that
summarized the study and potential risks and benefits to the respon-
dent, detailed the confidentiality measures taken to protect respon-
dent identity, and allowed the interview to be recorded, among other
things.
The interviews explored themes of financial goals, knowledge,
and behavior; income and expenditures (both monthly and after the
refund); experiences with financial and social service institutions;
experiences with public benefits and comparisons to the EITC; sav-
ings and assets; home and work life; housing and neighborhood; and
family background.49
C. Data Analysis
After the interviews, professional transcribers transcribed the
recordings word for word. The transcriptions were loaded into a stan-
dard qualitative methods analysis program (Access) and analyzed
using content analysis, a form of qualitative analysis developed for
examining data such as interviews. The research team worked
together to develop a detailed codebook with instructions for trained
coders. The transcripts were coded into both numeric and thematic
fields. Numeric information, such as a detailed accounting of annual
income and expenditure, EITC receipt and allocation, savings, and
debt, among others, were analyzed using quantitative data analysis
software (STATA).50 Thematic data, such as the decisionmaking
processes that underlie EITC allocations and patterns of saving and
debt, mobility goals, views about financial institutions and credit
cards, work, and experiences with the welfare system, among others,
personal interviews with low-income single mothers); KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN,
MAKING ENDS MEET: HOW SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE
WORK (1997) (studying the budgets of single mothers through qualitative interviews to
determine to what extent their basic needs are met by the income generated from low-
wage work); Kathryn Edin, Client-Based Ethnographic Research as a Tool for
Implementation Analysis, in POLICY INTO ACTION: IMPLEMENTATION RESEARCH AND
WELFARE REFORM 165–91 (Mary Claire Lennon & Thomas Corbett eds., 2003)
(describing the benefits that qualitative, client-centered research can bring to the evalua-
tion of social programs).
49 The interview guide had seventy-one questions. Many of the questions had multiple
subparts. Interviewers were directed to loosely follow the guide, but also to ask relevant
follow-up questions and probes that were not part of the guide and to skip questions that
were clearly irrelevant to the individual respondent.
50 For a summary of this quantitative information, see infra Appendix A.
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were sorted into broad topical categories and further coded and ana-
lyzed using standard qualitative analysis techniques.51
After the initial coding process, the coders analyzed the data
more specifically for information on shock events and coping strate-
gies. Two coders and I read each transcript and wrote a separate
memo on each respondent that listed (1) the shock event(s) exper-
ienced,52 (2) what, if anything, triggered the shock event, (3) how the
respondent coped with the shock event and reasons for selecting one
or more coping strategies, and (4) the effects of the event for the
respondent’s family. Once these memos were analyzed and codes
were developed for each shock event, coping strategy, and shock
effect, each transcript was formally coded according to these
51 The codebook included general rules, then the following topic modules: 1. General/
Demographic codes (37 subcodes); 2. Current Household (4 subcodes); 3. Family History
(5 subcodes); 4. Current Neighborhood (3 subcodes); 5. EITC Income and Expenditure (10
subcodes); 6. EITC Knowledge (1 subcode); 7. Other Income and Expenditure (14 sub-
codes); 8. Banking, Debt, and Assets (6 subcodes); 9. Parental Values and Children’s
Activities (6 subcodes); 10. Future Plans (4 subcodes). Once data had been coded,
researchers could use Access to analyze information by type of code. For example, one
code relevant to this Article was “EITCSPEND,” a subcode of the “EITC Income and
Expenditure” module. EITCSPEND is described in the codebook as:
Description of respondent’s use (or thoughts of using) EITC to pay off debt, as
well as what type of debt they have and would pay off with the EITC. Include
respondent’s use (or thoughts of using) EITC to save for a big-ticket item.
Also include respondent’s view of spending more money in December and
January because they know a tax refund is coming—whether they know
anyone who does or do it themselves.
A researcher could view all text coded as EITCSPEND and compare responses by dif-
ferent demographic factors. For example, a researcher could view all responses to this
question from people who had a credit card and compare them to those of people who did
not. Another code relevant to this Article was “GovAssist,” a subcode of the “Other
Income and Expenditure” module. GovAssist is described in the codebook as
“Respondent’s experiences with receiving government assistance.” The codebook directs
researchers to “include respondent’s experiences with TANF over the entire process—
applying, what they liked, didn’t like, if they received any lump sums, experiences of
friends and family with TANF and respondent’s description of how TANF works.”
52 We used previous studies about shock and trigger events as guides, but unlike these
previous studies, we did not begin the coding process looking for specific shock/trigger
events. See infra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. Instead, we used the previously
identified trigger events as a guide, but also recorded any event that respondents described
as initially unanticipated and potentially damaging to economic well-being as a shock
event. We coded any such event that happened within the past five years. After several
phases of coding, the following fifteen key events were experienced by at least five respon-
dents: medical or disability status changes (both physical and mental health issues); compli-
cations from pregnancy or birth of a child; changes in employment status; relationship
issues (including domestic violence, divorce, and separation); death of a family member;
incarceration of partner; incarceration of self; family network breakdown or burden; crime
victimization; car repairs; home repairs; loss of housing; public assistance issues (such as
loss of food stamps or welfare); loss of child support; and banking issues (such as unex-
pected overdraft fees).
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categories. The “shock effect” category was coded as one of the fol-
lowing: (1) no change, (2) moved to homeless shelter, (3) moved to
less expensive apartment, (4) moved in with family or friends, or (5)
lack of food and basic necessities.
D. Qualitative Methodology
Several prominent legal scholars have used qualitative method-
ology to study questions about the law.53 Qualitative methods enable
researchers to engage in “process tracking,” which helps to “discern
how processes emerge and evolve.”54 They are seen as advantageous
over surveys in that they allow scholars to understand “the experi-
ence[s] of individuals within social contexts” and “allow for the inclu-
sion of subjective experience[s] and cultural sense making . . . .”55
Qualitative data often provide insight into “the cultural understand-
ings actors bring to social experience, interactions, and institutions.”56
Qualitative interviews also allow researchers to build rapport and
trust with the participants during the interview, which may increase
the chances of obtaining potentially embarrassing and personal infor-
mation about debt, finances, and family circumstances.57
For this study, interviewing was the ideal methodology because
the goal was to obtain a rich account of people’s experiences and
opinions about welfare, the EITC, credit cards, and their finances. We
needed open-ended questions and answers and follow-up questions to
truly understand respondents’ feelings about welfare and the EITC,
the underlying cultural explanations, and the respondents’ financial
behavior and norms. Additionally, interviewing respondents in their
homes likely made them more comfortable while discussing personal
financial and family information. The qualitative in-depth interview
process enabled me to understand why the respondents favor the
EITC over welfare, why they are resistant to welfare-type programs,
and how they think about and handle shock events. Many of their
answers were unexpected, and surveys that forced them to select a
pre-determined answer would not have captured the cultural explana-
tions for respondents’ financial behaviors. Overall, the interview pro-
cess allowed me to capture the true safety net needs of respondents
and to develop a policy proposal that addresses the financial needs of
53 For examples of such studies, see supra note 32.
54 LAMONT & WHITE, supra note 32, at 10.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See Littwin, supra note 32, at 504 (discussing the means by which the author worked
to build trust between the interviewer and the interviewee in order to obtain sensitive
financial information).
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EITC recipients while taking into account their underlying cultural
beliefs, attitudes, and resulting behaviors.
II
THE EVOLVING SAFETY NET: THE EITC
REPLACES WELFARE
A. The Mechanics of the EITC
The EITC is a refundable tax credit that supplements the earn-
ings of low-income workers. The EITC is run through the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) and resembles other tax refunds in administra-
tion and public perception, but in substance it is more like other social
welfare programs such as SNAP and TANF.58 Families with children
are eligible to receive the most sizable benefits from the EITC;
workers without children can receive modest EITC benefits. To
qualify, families must have earned some money working in the tax
year.59
The EITC refund is typically received in a lump sum each year
after filing taxes (usually between February and April).60 The EITC
offers a subsidy to those whose earnings are under a certain threshold;
in 2011, the threshold was $40,964 for a single parent with two chil-
dren and $46,044 for a married family with two children.61 The exact
amount families receive is significant. In 2011, the credit averaged
$2240.62
58 See Alstott, Limitations, supra note 18, at 533 (“Although the EITC is styled as a
‘refundable tax credit,’ in fact it is a kind of welfare program—or, in economists’ terms, an
income-transfer program.”); Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the
Earned Income Tax Credit, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1867, 1867 (2005) (“Although generally tax-
like in its administration, in substance [the EITC] resembles nontax antipoverty transfer
programs, such as Food Stamps and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).”).
59 26 U.S.C. § 32(a), (c) (2006); see Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Who’s Afraid of
Redistribution? An Analysis of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 74 MO. L. REV. 251, 255–56
(2009) (describing some of the qualifications required to be eligible for the EITC).
60 From 2002 to 2004, workers had the option of claiming a portion of their expected
EITC on a monthly basis, but only 3% did so. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
REPORT TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION: ADVANCE EARNED INCOME TAX
CREDIT 3 (Aug. 2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071110.pdf.
61 2011 Tax Year EITC Income Limits, Maximum Credit Amounts and Tax Law
Updates, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/2011-Tax-Year-EITC-
Income-Limits,-Maximum-Credit—Amounts-and-Tax-Law-Updates (last updated Jan. 23,
2013).
62 EITC Statistics, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., http://www.eitc.irs.gov/central/eitcstats
(last updated Jan. 23, 2012).
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The EITC has a phase-in range, a plateau range, and a phase-out
range for benefits.63 In the phase-in range, each additional dollar of
income is supplemented by the credit.64 In the plateau range, workers
receive the maximum credit and increased earnings do not change the
credit amount.65 In the phase-out range, the credit is gradually
reduced as the worker’s earnings increase.66 The exact point at which
families hit the plateau and phase-out ranges vary by the number of
children claimed. For a single mother of three who works full time,
benefits gradually increase with earnings up to $12,779. With earnings
between $12,780 and $16,690, the mother’s benefit plateaus at $5751,
and with earnings between $16,691 and $43,998, the benefits gradually
decrease.67 There are several other requirements for EITC eligibility.
Those who qualify must file a tax return and have a valid Social
Security number.68 Additionally, if a taxpayer has fraudulently
claimed the EITC in the past year or claimed more than she was enti-
tled to, this may render the applicant ineligible in future years.69
B. A Brief History of the EITC
In its early years, the EITC was just one of many relatively small
programs aimed at low-income workers.70 The early underpinnings for
the EITC were part of Nixon’s proposed “Family Assistance Plan”
(FAP) in 1969,71 influenced by Milton Friedman’s idea for a “negative
63 See Tax Year 2011 Income Limits and Range of EITC, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
http://www.eitc.irs.gov/central/abouteitc/ranges/ (last updated Oct. 9, 2012) (displaying the
ranges in a chart of EITC amount received versus income level).
64 See id.
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See id. For a visual chart detailing the ranges for families with zero to three children,
see id.
68 See I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(E) (2006); see also Basic Qualifications, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., http://www.eitc.irs.gov/central/abouteitc/basicqualifications (last updated Dec. 11,
2012) (providing more information about qualifications for the EITC).
69 See I.R.C. § 32(k) (2006) (disallowing the EITC for those who have made a fraudu-
lent claim in the last ten years, a reckless claim in the last two years, or an improper claim
without subsequently demonstrating eligibility).
70 See Alstott, Limitations, supra note 18, at 534 (describing the modest size of the
initial EITC program).
71 See Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation on Domestic Programs, 2 PUB. PAPERS
637, 638, 641 (Aug. 8, 1969), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid
=2191 (proposing a system that would “establish a work requirement and a work incen-
tive” as a “complete replacement of the present welfare system”); see also Bird-Pollan,
supra note 59, at 252 (“The EITC was instituted in response to the Family Assistance
Plan . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Zelenak, supra note 20, at 304 (noting that
the EITC followed Nixon’s failed Family Assistance Plan proposal).
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income tax” in the United States.72 Under Nixon’s FAP proposal,
families with children were eligible for a maximum benefit payment of
$500 each for the first two family members and $300 for each addi-
tional member.73 Families had to show that they were attempting to
find work, but they did not have to actually be working to receive the
money.74 FAP also allowed families to keep the first $720 of any earn-
ings, in addition to half of any further income up to $4000, and still be
eligible for FAP.75 FAP was a political failure, garnering strong criti-
cisms that it created a work disincentive; it was ultimately defeated in
the Senate.76
Senator Russell Long (D-LA)—chair of the Senate Finance
Committee77 at the time FAP was being debated and who advocated
against it—proposed an alternative to FAP in 1972 that required
recipients to earn income in order to receive the credit.78 Ultimately,
due in large part to Long’s efforts, the EITC was enacted as part of
the Tax Reduction Act of 1975.79 Before the 1990s, the EITC
remained a fairly small program, with Congress making only minor
adjustments.80 However, in the 1990s, as President Clinton began a
major push to reform welfare, the EITC gained national
prominence.81
72 Zelenak, supra note 20, at 302–03. Milton Friedman noted that the tax system could
be used to give a subsidy to an individual who earned a gross income less than the total of
her exemptions plus deductions (in other words, her negative taxable income); the amount
of the subsidy would be a percentage of her negative taxable income. See MILTON
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 191–92 (40th anniversary ed. 2002). For example,
an individual with an income of $2000 and a standard deduction and personal exemption
totaling $12,000 would have a negative taxable income of $10,000. If her negative income
tax rate were 50%, she would receive a subsidy of $5000. Under Friedman’s proposal, the
rates of subsidy could be graduated to set a maximum limit to the subsidy amount. Even a
person with no income at all would receive the subsidy. See id.
73 H.R. REP. NO. 91-904, at 3 (1970).
74 See id. at 20–23 (requiring work registration and nonrefusal of suitable work but not
requiring work itself).
75 See id. at 4 (listing the criteria for determining a family’s eligibility and amount of
benefit).
76 See Bird-Pollan, supra note 59, at 253 (discussing the specific features of FAP that
led to its defeat).
77 Long was chair of the Senate Finance Committee from 1966 to 1981.
78 Bird-Pollan, supra note 59, at 253.
79 Id.; Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 204, 89 Stat. 26, 30–32 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 32).
80 See Bird-Pollan, supra note 59, at 253–54 (“In 1986, the EITC was indexed for infla-
tion and made a permanent . . . part of the tax system. In 1990, Congress made a larger
credit available for families with two or more children . . . .”).
81 See Alstott, Limitations, supra note 18, at 533–34 (noting that the EITC had
“recently assumed a central role in U.S. social welfare policy” and that its 1993 expansion
was “a key feature of President Clinton’s plan for welfare reform”).
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C. The Rise of the EITC and the Fall of Welfare
In 1996, “welfare as we [knew] it”82 ended. The Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) entitlement program was replaced
by TANF, which imposed strict time limits and participation require-
ments on beneficiaries.83 Predictably, the number of families receiving
welfare plummeted from roughly 4.5 million in 199684 to only 1.9 mil-
lion in 2011.85 The complete story of the politics of welfare reform and
the rise of the EITC has been ably told elsewhere86 and is beyond the
scope of this Article, but nonetheless the basic story is important to
consider when assessing the EITC.
By the early 1990s, there was bipartisan consensus behind a work-
based welfare program and almost no support for continuing welfare
as an entitlement program.87 The political tide had changed such that
the goal of federal poverty programs became “making work pay.”88
Indefinite entitlement programs such as welfare were scorned, and
“individual responsibility” and “economic self-sufficiency” became
key terms of the rhetoric surrounding federal antipoverty programs.89
82 When President Clinton enacted welfare reform by signing TANF into law, he said,
“Today, we are ending welfare as we know it.” Barbara Vobejda, Clinton Signs Welfare Bill
Amid Division, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1996, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-srv/politics/special/welfare/stories/wf082396.htm.
83 See MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 21–22 (1999) (discussing the history and consequences
of the 1996 enactment of TANF).
84 Office of Family Assistance, 1996 AFDC Total Caseload, ADMIN. FOR CHILD. &
FAM. ARCHIVES, http://www.archive.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/caseload/afdc/
1996/fycytotal96_ek.htm (last updated Dec. 19, 2004).
85 Office of Family Assistance, Fiscal and Calendar Year 2011 - TANF: Total Number of
Families, ADMIN. FOR CHILD. & FAM. (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/
resource/2011-family-tan.
86 See generally REBECCA M. BLANK, IT TAKES A NATION: A NEW APPROACH TO
FIGHTING POVERTY 220–51 (1997) (describing in detail the story of welfare reform);
Alstott, Limitations, supra note 18, at 536–40 (describing the rise of the EITC in an envi-
ronment of bipartisan anti-welfare rhetoric); Vicki Lens, Public Voices and Public Policy:
Changing the Societal Discourse on “Welfare,” 39 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 137, 137–46
(2002) (discussing the politicized language that comprised the discourse on welfare
reform).
87 See GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE’S END 1–6 (1998) (“Both parties championed
wage work and marriage as alternatives to welfare . . . . Both parties equated welfare use
with welfare abuse, justifying increasingly punitive ‘reforms.’”); see also Alstott,
Limitations, supra note 18, at 537–38 & 538 nn.13–18 (noting widespread support for pro-
moting work, rather than entitlement, for welfare programs).
88 See Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 19, at 287 (dis-
cussing the political slogan “making work pay” as a representation of the goal that low-
income individuals be induced to work to receive the benefits of EITC); see also Alstott,
Limitations, supra note 18, at 538 (“[T]here is an apparent political consensus in support of
reforms that in some way link welfare and work.”).
89 See Lens, supra note 86, at 144–46 (discussing how political elites used morally
charged language to frame the ideological debate on welfare reform); see also MINK, supra
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One of the leading critiques of welfare was that it created finan-
cial disincentives to work and to accumulate assets, thus reducing the
chances of long-term mobility for the poor.90 There was a related con-
cern that welfare provided help for the non-working poor, but that
note 87, at 4 (discussing the view that poverty is a result of “moral failing”); Alstott,
Limitations, supra note 18, at 538–39 (“In the current political climate, then, work and
responsibility are ‘in’ and traditional welfare is ‘out.’”).
90 See generally DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN
FAMILY 121–27 (1988) (arguing that a transitional work program was needed for the poor
on welfare); LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT 4 (1986) (arguing that welfare
recipients will not truly be accepted into American society unless they also work to earn
income); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950–1980, at
154–66 (1984) (arguing that changes to welfare law in the 1960s discouraged work and
marriage). In fact, a similar concern was raised about the EITC in its early years. A recip-
ient earning income in the EITC phase-out range has some disincentive to work because
each extra dollar earned could result in a loss of over fifty cents of aid. Critics predicted
that the disincentive effect would be substantial. See Edgar K. Browning, Effects of the
Earned Income Tax Credit on Income and Welfare, 48 NAT’L TAX J. 23, 23 (1995) (esti-
mating that “nearly half of recipients in the phase-out range will reduce earning enough so
that their total disposable incomes decline”); Marvin H. Kosters, The Earned Income Tax
Credit and the Working Poor, AM. ENTERPRISE, May–June 1993, at 64 (“Early research
had concluded . . . [that] the EITC would significantly reduce cumulative hours worked for
low-income individuals.”); Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Collision of Tax and Welfare Politics:
The Political History of the Earned Income Tax Credit, in MAKING WORK PAY: THE
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AND ITS IMPACT ON AMERICA’S FAMILIES, supra note 30, at
15, 40–41 (stating that according to early research, the EITC reduced cumulative hours
worked for low-income individuals when in the phase-out range) (citing Select Aspects of
Welfare Reform: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures & Subcomm.
on Human Res. of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 103d Cong. 106–16 (1993) (statement
of Marvin H. Kosters, Director, Economic Policy Studies, American Enterprise Institute)).
However, empirical studies of actual data from the first years after the EITC expansion
indicated that this concern was overblown; researchers found no significant impact on
hours worked. See, e.g., Nada Eissa & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Labor Supply Response to
Earned Income Tax Credit, 111 Q.J. ECON. 605, 629–36 (1996) (finding that the EITC
expansion did not reduce aggregate hours worked, with the implication that the phase-out
range did not meaningfully disincentivize work). Studies also found that the EITC expan-
sion significantly increased aggregate labor-force participation among single workers, thus
verifying the predicted incentive effect provided by the EITC’s phase-in range. Jeffrey B.
Liebman, The Impact of the Earned Income Tax Credit on Incentives and Income
Distribution, 12 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 80, 97–104 (1998) (expanding on his earlier 1996
study with co-author Eissa on labor-force participation, Eissa & Liebman, supra, which
yielded the same result). The findings from this study are consistent with those of the
empirical studies above. The traditional economic concern about work disincentives
assumes that recipients have full knowledge of exactly how the EITC works, including
when the phase-out range begins, but the majority of recipients in this study did not.
Indeed, most families did not know the exact amount of their refund beforehand. Laura
Tach, Tax Time 25 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the New York University
Law Review). The concern also assumes that EITC recipients are able to game the system
by controlling the number of hours they work. However, most of the recipients in this
study had jobs with set hours; they could not say to their employers: “I want to work eight
fewer hours per week, so my earnings fall below X level.” Not only were they unable to
control their income in such a specific manner, they had not even considered doing so. See
id. at 25–27 (discussing recipients’ behavioral responses to refunds).
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there was little help available for the working poor.91 Martin Gilens
discusses how the media contributed to a strong public perception that
welfare recipients were lazy women who would rather be siting at
home watching television and waiting for their welfare checks than
working.92
At the same time that welfare reform was in the works, then-
President Clinton and other politicians gave speeches praising the
EITC and adopting strong anti-welfare tones.93 In President Clinton’s
1994 State of the Union address, he said that the EITC “reward[s]
work over welfare . . . . Now that’s real welfare reform.”94 Clinton
later called the EITC “a cornerstone of our effort to reform the wel-
fare system and make work pay.”95 For the most part, since the push
for welfare reform, the EITC has enjoyed bipartisan support96—
largely because commentators believe it is everything the old welfare
system was not.97 Commentators have expressed support for the
EITC because they believe it is not stigmatizing, it may help with asset
accumulation, and it increases autonomy.98 Steve Holt of the
Brookings Institution argues that “the EITC has proved remarkably
successful in reducing poverty. . . . lift[ing] more children out of pov-
erty than any other social program or category of programs.”99 The
91 See ELLWOOD, supra note 90, at 98–104 (noting the lack of help available for the
working poor during the welfare era).
92 See GILENS, supra note 83, at 3 (arguing that “Americans hate welfare because they
view it as a program that rewards the undeserving poor” due to a “widespread belief that
most welfare recipients would rather sit home and collect benefits than work hard to sup-
port themselves”); see also id. at 102–32 (detailing how the media contributed to the nega-
tive public perception of welfare).
93 See Alstott, Limitations, supra note 18, at 539.
94 William J. Clinton, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of
the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 126, 129 (Jan. 25, 1994), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
pkg/PPP-1994-book1/pdf/PPP-1994-book1-doc-pg126-3.pdf.
95 Memorandum on the Earned Income Tax Credit, 1 PUB. PAPERS 413, 413 (Mar. 9,
1994), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1994-book1/pdf/PPP-1994-book1-
doc-pg413.pdf.
96 See supra note 29. While the EITC generally enjoys widespread bipartisan support, a
few politicians on the far right have voiced concerns that it is too generous—essentially
welfare with a different name. For example, Rep. Bill Archer (R-Tex.) asked, “Is it fair to
ask middle-income taxpayers to give additional public assistance to those who pay little or
no taxes?” Ventry, supra note 90, at 35.
97 See Alstott, Limitations, supra note 18, at 539 (noting support for the EITC because
it avoids many of the perceived weaknesses of welfare).
98 See, e.g., ELLWOOD, supra note 90, at 115 (“The EITC helps the working poor while
mainly avoiding the conundrums [of welfare]. The rewards of work are increased, not
diminished. . . . People are helped without any need of a stigmatizing, invasive, and often
degrading welfare system, and their autonomy is increased, not decreased.”).
99 STEVE HOLT, BROOKINGS INST., THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AT AGE 30:
WHAT WE KNOW 13 (2006), available at http://www.brookings.edu/∼/media/research/files/
reports/2006/2/childrenfamilies%20holt/20060209_holt.pdf.
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EITC has been described as a “time-honored policy tool for
improving tax fairness, one that enjoys strong, bipartisan support and
targets direct relief to the families who need it most.”100 Congress has
approved several major increases in funding for the program while
spending for other cash-spending programs has remained flat.101 Most
recently, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA)
increased EITC benefits for families with three children and increased
the amount of money that married couples can earn before they enter
the phase-out range.102 The Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2010
extended these program expansions through 2012.103
D. Lack of Clear Congressional Intent and Past Scholarly Study
As Bird-Pollan and other scholars noted, “[o]ne of the greatest
difficulties facing anyone studying the EITC is the lack of any explicit
[c]ongressional purpose for the credit.”104 Put another way, Lawrence
Zelenak writes, “Despite the political success of the EITC, the credit
remains severely undertheorized. Although Congress has revised the
credit a number of times, it has never accompanied those revisions
with legislative history explaining the purpose of the credit, except in
the vaguest and most general terms.”105 The lack of clear congres-
sional intent makes for varied scholarly treatment of the EITC. There
are two main threads of EITC commentary. First, some scholars ask
who should (and should not) receive the EITC and focus on how to
calculate the amount recipients should receive.106 This body of
100 Letter to the Editor, Fairer Tax Treatment, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 2009, available at
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-04-16/news/0904150556_1_income-tax-tax-time-tax-
day.
101 Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 19, at 285.
102 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1002, 123
Stat. 115, 312 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 32).
103 Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 103, 124 Stat. 3296, 3299 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 32(b)(3)(A)
(2012)).
104 Bird-Pollan, supra note 59, at 258; see also id. at 284 (“One significant hurdle faced
by supporters of the EITC and those who propose maintaining and expanding the credit
lies in the continuing lack of an explicit purpose.”). Analyzing what information is avail-
able in an attempt to infer intent, Bird-Pollan concludes that the original intent may have
focused on offsetting payroll taxes for very low-income earners. Later, however, there
seems to be evidence that Congress was focused on supplementing the income of working
families whose earnings level kept them below the poverty line and easing the burden
experienced by those who lost their welfare subsidies as they began working. See id. at
259–60, 284. However, these conclusions are inferences made by piecing together many
different documents, and Bird-Pollan acknowledges that intent is by no means transparent.
Id. at 284.
105 Zelenak, supra note 20, at 301.
106 For example, Lawrence Zelenak argues that the EITC “should be revised to function
as an adjustment to the minimum wage based on family size, designed to ensure that no
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literature, as a whole, focuses on the big questions of “who?” and
“how much?” and tackles problems such as an inherent marriage pen-
alty in the EITC and the fact that it does not treat different family
structures equally.107 These types of questions and proposals are vital
and deserve further thought, but my data are not suited to directly
contribute to this project, and these questions are not the focus of this
Article.
The second strain of literature discusses EITC administration.
Much of this work focuses on whether the IRS is the best place to
house income transfer programs such as the EITC. The main
problems are that the EITC does not appropriately measure wealth
(since qualification is dependent only on income, not savings and
assets);108 that the EITC may not reach people who qualify but do not
file taxes;109 and that the EITC fosters noncompliance and fraud.110
family headed by a working parent lives in poverty, regardless of the number of children in
the family.” See Zelenak, supra note 20, at 302. Jane Gravelle argues that the EITC should
be designed so that families with equal pretax standard of living also have equal after-tax
standards of living. JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL INCOME TAX
TREATMENT OF THE FAMILY 12 (2006), available at http://www.policyarchive.org/handle/
10207/bitstreams/3032.pdf. Lily Batchelder argues for an increase in EITC benefits for
most families through a different channel: She analyzes data to show that “taxation of
annual income disproportionately burdens low-income families” and advocates “Targeted
Averaging,” which would allow taxpayers to calculate their EITC benefits based on two
years of income and to “carry back for one year of their unused standard deductions and
personal and dependent accounts.” Batchelder, supra note 7, at 397.
107 In a related question, Anne Alstott asks whether the EITC can truly make a mean-
ingful difference in lifting low-income families out of poverty. Alstott, Why the EITC
Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 19, at 289–97. My data confirm several of Alstott’s
critiques of the EITC, including her concern that it is unresponsive to financial shocks
experienced by low-income workers. See Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay,
supra note 19, at 302–04. However, my data also show that there are other reasons to
salvage the credit that focus less on strict economic consequences and more on the dignity
of low-income workers and the sense of purpose they get from working and receiving tax
credits. My proposal attempts to transform the EITC into a program that addresses this
concern in ways workers suggest they would want help. This is not to dispute the validity of
many of Alstott’s concerns. My proposal simply considers the voices of current EITC
recipients while attempting to mend what both Alstott and I believe is a broken safety net.
My data speak only to those who are already receiving the EITC; within this group, the
EITC is universally liked and has many benefits. It is in this context that I seek to improve
it.
108 Alstott, Limitations, supra note 18, at 571–76 (discussing problems with how the
income tax system measures income and not wealth, meaning it “cannot comprehensively
assess total economic resources”).
109 See George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor:
Proposals To Reform the Earned Income Tax Credit Program, 11 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 225,
253 (1994) (discussing various reasons why those who qualify for the EITC may not access
benefits). But see Alstott, Limitations, supra note 18, at 585–86 (“[A]vailable data confirm
that the EITC has relatively high participation rates. . . . [T]he EITC participation rate is
still substantially higher than participation rates in traditional income-transfer programs.”).
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While this Article does not address the technical issues these con-
cerns raise, my data show that based on the experiences and desires of
EITC recipients, there are strong advantages to keeping the EITC
within the realm of the IRS. At a minimum, my data show that going
back to a system that resembles the old welfare system would not be
desirable and may have unintended negative consequences for current
EITC recipients.111
This Article primarily evaluates the EITC from a different van-
tage point. Rather than starting with a complex academic analysis of
what the credit should do, it starts from the ground up—with the
voices of EITC recipients. The data help shed light on the role of the
EITC in the lives of low-income workers. I use these data to evaluate
how the EITC can be used to help low-income working families in the
ways they say they need it most and how it can serve as a renewed
public safety net to help catch them in these unstable economic times.
The lack of clear congressional guidance with regard to the EITC’s
implementation underscores the need to understand the role of the
EITC from the viewpoint of recipients. My Article begins this project.
III
“THANK GOD FOR TAX SEASON”: THE EITC AND
WELFARE FROM THE RECIPIENT’S
POINT OF VIEW
The merits of the EITC over welfare have received much com-
mentary, but one important perspective was missing: that of recipi-
ents. By better understanding how the recipients think about both
welfare and the EITC and the role of the EITC in their lives, policy
makers can design changes to the program that take into account the
cultural and behavioral responses of recipients. If these policy innova-
tions take into account the perspectives of those they are designed to
serve, they may be more effective.
When asked to evaluate the EITC, recipients’ assessments were
overwhelmingly positive. Responses such as, “Thank God for tax
110 See Alstott, Limitations, supra note 18, at 586–87 (discussing the aspects of the EITC
program that make it particularly vulnerable to fraud); Yin et al., supra note 109, at 247–50
(noting concerns and statistics about noncompliance, including people overclaiming the
credit and filing when they do not qualify).
111 This is not to say that the EITC adequately replaces welfare (TANF) for all potential
recipients. This Article can only help us understand the role of the EITC in the lives of
current recipients. There are likely many missing parties—those that do not qualify or do
not file for the EITC may be in desperate need of other programs to keep them and their
children from dire circumstances. These people are not part of the sample in this dataset,
and thus the Article cannot examine how to best address their needs.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\88-2\NYU201.txt unknown Seq: 25 19-APR-13 14:12
May 2013] THE BROKEN SAFETY NET 539
season”112 and “It was like hitting the lottery for us”113 were typical.
One respondent said, “I think about [the refund] all year long, you
know what I mean, it’s like oh, I can’t wait until I get my tax
money . . . .”114 No matter how families used the extra income, their
normative evaluations of the refund were similar—they did not feel
stigmatized because they received the EITC.115 Instead, they were
proud that they had worked hard, as higher-income families do, to
receive their tax refund.116
The majority of respondents felt both deserving and appreciative
of the EITC—they viewed it as a reward for hard work.117 One
respondent stated, “I think it works out fine. . . . I can’t complain! I
mean it’s somethin’, you know, it’s somethin’. I mean, you could get
back nothing.”118 Another said, “I actually think the Earned Income
Tax Credit works very well . . . . Because it puts a little more money in
the family’s pocket, you know. That’s about it, that’s the best thing
that you could do . . . very helpful.”119 These sentiments were typical
of the majority of respondents.
Just how much respondents feel the credit helps with their finan-
cial situation varies, but almost all of them agree that it “helps out a
lot.”120 As one respondent explained: “It’s just nice to know that it’s
coming, that, you know, you can relax for a little bit and you have that
extra money in your pocket.”121 Another respondent said that the
EITC helped her “[j]ust get a little ahead of the game . . . . Just
breathe a little better. . . . What a feeling. . . . It made it a lot easier.”122
Respondents reported favorable feelings toward the EITC not
just because it provides much-needed financial relief, but also because
it allowed them to feel, as one respondent said, like “a real
American.”123 Terms such as “taxpayer,” “earner,” and “hard worker”
112 Interview with Respondent 44 (July 2, 2007).
113 Interview with Respondent 59 (June 27, 2007).
114 Interview with Respondent 57 (Sept. 12 & 26, 2007).
115 No respondent (out of the 194) reported feeling stigmatized because they received
the EITC.
116 See Jennifer Sykes et al., Dignity and Dreams: What the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) Means to Low-Income Families 30 (Feb. 22, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with the New York University Law Review) (noting, based on analysis of the data used
in this Article, that EITC recipients view the EITC as a reward for hard work).
117 Id.
118 Interview with Respondent 41 (Aug. 16, 2007).
119 Interview with Respondent 29 (July 23, 2007).
120 Interview with Respondent 92 (Sept. 8, 2007).
121 Id.
122 Interview with Respondent 2 (July 16, 2007).
123 Sykes et al., supra note 116, at 29.
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were common in the narratives that respondents invoked when
describing themselves as wage-earning EITC recipients.124
The EITC also allowed respondents to feel—if only for a short
time—as if their children were ordinary American kids,125 and
allowed them to give their children small treats, which made the kids
feel “like a million dollars.”126 One respondent, for example, noted
that her children usually get “what they need, but they may not like
it.”127 With the EITC, however, she “was able to take them to the
store and let them pick their clothes.”128
Respondents’ feelings about the EITC were in stark contrast to
their feelings about welfare. Indeed, there is significant evidence that
welfare recipients disliked the program,129 despite the public percep-
tion to the contrary.130 In this study, the respondents’ sentiments were
no different. Both respondents who had been on welfare in the past
and respondents who were on welfare at the time of the interview
(only 7%) all had an overwhelmingly negative stereotype of the “wel-
fare lifestyle” as portrayed by the popular media.131 Respondents
across the board discussed welfare using a moral rhetoric, with great
contempt for those they perceived as taking advantage of the system.
For example, when one respondent was asked about welfare, she said,
“[T]here’s people out there who really can work and they’re getting
all this welfare . . . so we’re paying [them] money when they are really
124 Id. For a detailed discussion of the findings about the social meaning of the EITC to
recipients based on this data, see id. at 28–33, in which the authors argue that EITC recipi-
ents view the EITC as just reward for their work and that the EITC enhances feelings of
citizenship and social inclusion.
125 Id. at 20.
126 Interview with Respondent 64 (July 11, 2007); see also Sykes et al., supra note 116, at
20–22 (arguing that the EITC validates parents’ identities as providers and, thus, parents
spend a small amount of the refund on treats for their children).
127 Interview with Respondent 64 (July 11, 2007).
128 Id. Another respondent talked about going out to lunch once or twice with her
daughter: “once to Uno’s and once to Friday’s because we want[ed] to try it out. . . . That’s
what we did a couple of times . . . . Go places that you don’t go on a regular basis.”
Interview with Respondent 14 (June 30, 2007). While many respondents spent a portion of
their refund on these kinds of “treats” for their children to make them feel less impover-
ished and more like ordinary children, the percentage of the refund spent on such con-
sumption was very modest—on average only 11%. Sykes et al., supra note 116, at 19.
129 See, e.g., EDIN & LEIN, supra note 48, at 76–78 (finding that the majority of mothers
they studied wanted to work and had plans to leave welfare as soon as they felt they were
able); WILSON, supra note 30, at 85 (finding that welfare was not a desirable alternative to
work for poor mothers and noting that 80% of mothers in his sample who received AFDC
answered that they received it because of the shortage of “decent” jobs rather than in
order not to work).
130 See GILENS, supra note 83, at 2–3 (arguing that there is a public perception that
welfare recipients were lazy and enjoyed being on welfare so that they did not have to
work).
131 Id.
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able to work.”132 She was careful to note that she might fall on hard
times too, but continued, “God forgive me because I don’t like to, you
know, criticize. I don’t know where I might be tomorrow, too . . . .
They just spent their money bing-banging, doing whatever out on the
street. . . . So how easy is it for them to get state money that we’re
paying for them?”133 Respondents who had previously received wel-
fare drew moral boundaries between themselves and other welfare
recipients that they perceived as immoral. They described their wel-
fare experiences as necessary and a result of bad luck, in contrast to
others, who were lazy.134 One respondent said, “It was the worst. . . .
I’m not lazy. I like my own. I really don’t like for people to help me
unless I really need it. And it was at that time, I did.”135 Another
explained that she needed welfare to care for her injured daughter.
She said, “I had to take care of [my daughter] . . . she couldn’t use her
hand so I had to take a couple of months off for her. I had to go on
welfare so at that point I did go on welfare . . . for my daughter.”136
The universal sentiment of respondents was that they disliked
being on welfare and wanted to avoid it at all costs. Most respondents
reported feeling shame and self-loathing when they did go on welfare.
One respondent said, “[E]very time I used it, though, I felt like
crap . . . .”137 Another respondent said that she was so resistant to
using welfare that “[i]t actually took somebody to physically take me
by the hand and make me go there. I just, I didn’t want to. . . . I didn’t
tell anybody. I was very embarrassed. I hated it.”138 One immigrant
respondent said, “I’m coming from different part, they teach me, you
have to work for whatever you want. . . . I don’t like easy way some-
time. . . . I pray to God, never go to welfare. I know it’s nothing, but I
know some people go over there, and they don’t need it.”139 Several
respondents talked about the lack of independence they felt when on
welfare. A dialogue between a husband and wife demonstrates this
sentiment:
Wife: I never want to be on welfare ever. . . . It definitely wasn’t
enough, and I just didn’t like the whole idea of being on welfare,
like I didn’t want to do it kind of thing, but you do what you have
to. . . .
Husband: I think she might have been out of work.
132 Interview with Respondent 46 (Aug. 9, 2007).
133 Id. 
134 See, e.g., id. (describing one respondent’s negative opinion of welfare respondents).
135 Interview with Respondent 81 (Aug. 26, 2007).
136 Interview with Respondent 98 (Oct. 15, 2007).
137 Interview with Respondent 57 (Sept. 12 & 26, 2007).
138 Interview with Respondent 44 (July 2, 2007).
139 Interview with Respondent 43 (July 11, 2007).
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. . .
Wife: I just didn’t like the whole . . . .
Husband: It’s depending on other people. That’s what it is.
Wife: And I like to depend on myself.140
Another respondent talked about the lack of privacy when on welfare.
She said, “[Caseworkers] get on your case all the time . . . ‘come in the
office, come in the office, come in the office.’ . . . I think [the
caseworkers] look at you like you’re no good because you’re on assis-
tance. . . . I don’t think she respected me. . . . They were making me
look like a liar . . . .”141
What is striking about the welfare dialogue of the respondents is
that it mirrors the political debate surrounding welfare reform in 1996.
Caricatures of lazy women—taking advantage of the system while
buying themselves fancy clothes, meals, and drugs and making sure to
have a baby every two years to stay in the system—appeared
frequently in responses. One respondent, talking about her neighbors,
said: “[L]ike the family over there. They’re on welfare, that’s fine.
Whatever. Everyone got to do what everyone got to do. But they take
their check and spend it on drugs and addiction. . . . So it’s kinda like,
it’s going to the wrong hands.”142 Another respondent commented on
others whom she perceived as having more children just to increase
their welfare refunds, “I just be like looking at these girls like, wow,
you know all these kids. . . . [T]hey are going to cut welfare so what
are all of you going to do? . . . I’m not lazy like that; I will get a
job.”143
These caricatures are largely absent from the political discourse
today, but they have remained embedded in the discourse of lower-
income families and shape their current beliefs and actions.144
One respondent summed up what we heard from the majority of
respondents about their welfare experiences:
Interviewer: [W]hat was [receiving welfare] like?
Respondent: Terrible. . . . I’ll never do it again. . . . [I]t was the worst
experience. . . . I lived with my cousin, my mom threw me out after I
had [my son], and I lived with my cousin and my checks were
140 Interview with Respondent 56 (Aug. 22, 2007).
141 Interview with Respondent 21 (Aug. 14, 2007).
142 Interview with Respondent 54 (July 4, 2007).
143 Interview with Respondent 12 (July 10, 2007).
144 It is important to note that in light of current welfare rules, welfare can no longer be
a “lifestyle” because benefit receipt time is limited; is often contingent on performing a job
search, work, or volunteer activity; and in many states has been capped in such a way that
having an additional child does not usually give recipients higher benefits. However,
despite these changes, welfare receipt remains highly stigmatized among EITC recipients.
Id.
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getting sent back to the welfare office because my name wasn’t on
the mailbox. They sent fraud out at me, oh my God, it was the
worst. . . . [A]nd I’m like, “Oh, fuck this.” I went and got a job and
got off of it. Got off and worked ever since. . . . It was terrible. I’ll
never go back to them places again. Never. It’s not for me. . . . I
would never go back. . . . It was terrible. I swore I would work the
rest of my life. I didn’t care how I worked or where I worked, I
would never go back there again. Never. And I didn’t.145
Quantitative data lends further support to what respondents told
us: They are comfortable with the EITC, but are resistant to seeking
out welfare, even when they might need it. Roughly 80% of taxpayers
who qualify receive the EITC,146 whereas only 50% of those who
qualify for TANF receive it.147
Per the available data, the EITC appears to be very successful.
Low-income families much prefer the EITC to welfare, and the EITC
seems to have had the effect that many politicians and scholars hoped
for:148 Families receiving the EITC are resolute in their desire to avoid
welfare and continue working.
Not only does the EITC have overwhelming support, but in 2010,
the EITC lifted about 6.3 million people out of poverty including 3.3
million children.149 Indeed, more children now exit poverty through
the EITC than through any other form of government assistance.150
However, the EITC reached 26.8 million people and families in 2011,
but many millions are still living in poverty. The question is why the
EITC is insufficient to help these other families. In the next Part of
this Article, I turn to this question, looking specifically at what hap-
pens to EITC recipient families when they experience financial
shocks.151
145 Interview with Respondent 62 (Aug. 9, 2007).
146 INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., About EITC (Jan. 18, 2013), http://www.eitc.irs.gov/
central/abouteitc/.
147 SHEILA R. ZEDLEWSKI, THE URBAN INST., LEFT BEHIND OR STAYING AWAY?
ELIGIBLE PARENTS WHO REMAIN OFF TANF 1 (2002), available at http://www.urban.org/
uploadedPDF/310571_B51.pdf. There are other explanations, such as differences in the
administrative procedures to obtain benefits from each program, which may also con-
tribute to these different usage rates. Id.
148 See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing political and academic rhetoric
that work should be rewarded and promoted over entitlement programs such as welfare).
149 CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, POLICY BASICS: THE EARNED INCOME
TAX CREDIT 2 (2012), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/policybasics-eitc.pdf. This sta-
tistic was calculated using the official poverty line in the United States. For an important
discussion of whether the poverty line is a useful tool for evaluating the EITC’s success, see
Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 19, at 291–97.
150 CTR. ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 149.
151 Eighty-five percent of respondents in this study reported experiencing a financial
shock. See infra Part V (discussing the financial shocks experienced by respondents).
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IV
FINANCIAL SHOCKS AND THE NEW SAFETY NET
A. The Dangers of Financial Shocks in the Post–Welfare
Reform Era
At the same time that poor families shifted from the entitlement
program of welfare to the work-based EITC (and a downsized work-
based welfare), all Americans became less income-secure. Indeed,
income insecurity, defined as the risk of experiencing a period of pov-
erty, has grown over the last decade.152 It is important to recall just
how significant the growth has been: In the 1980s, 13% of Americans
spent one year below the poverty line; by the 1990s, this number grew
to 36%.153 Additionally, the probability that an average working-age
individual will experience at least a 50% drop in family income
increased from 7% in the 1970s to 17% by 2002.154
Past research provides insight into “trigger events,” which cause
emergency expenses for low-income people and thereby increase the
likelihood of families entering poverty. Trigger events that pose the
greatest risk of entry into poverty are changes in household composi-
tion, changes in employment status, and changes in disability status.155
Several other events have strong associations with entry into poverty,
including transition to a female head of household, young adults set-
ting up their own household, and a child being born into the
household.156
Analysis from this study shows that changes in medical or disa-
bility status (relating to both physical and mental health issues), com-
plications from pregnancy or birth of a child, changes in employment
152 See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing increasing financial instability
among American families).
153 NEWMAN & CHEN, supra note 5, at 178.
154 HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT, supra note 12, at 31–32.
155 See Mary Jo Bane & David T. Ellwood, Slipping into and out of Poverty: The
Dynamics of Spells, 21 J. HUM. RESOURCES 1, 13–17 (1986) (comparing how trigger events
affected families with different household compositions); Signe-Mary McKernan &
Caroline Ratcliffe, Events that Trigger Poverty Entries and Exits, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 1146, 1167
(2005) (concluding that changes in household composition, employment, and disability
entitlements were important trigger events). For a discussion of the effects of multiple
trigger events on poverty persistence, see Ann Huff Stevens, Climbing out of Poverty,
Falling Back In: Measuring the Persistence of Poverty over Multiple Spells, 34 J. HUM.
RESOURCES 557 (1999).
156 Bane & Ellwood, supra note 155, at 16; see also BLANK, supra note 86, at 5 (1997)
(discussing factors that put families headed by single mothers at risk for poverty); Patricia
Ruggles & Roberton Williams, Transitions in and out of Poverty: New Data from the
Survey of Income and Program Participation (U.S. Census Bureau, Working Paper No. 38,
1987), available at http://www.census.gov/sipp/workpapr/wp38_8716.pdf (examining six
trigger events and their correlation with entry into poverty).
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status, relationship issues (including domestic violence, divorce, and
separation), death of a family member, incarceration of a partner,
family network breakdown or burden, being the victim of a crime, car
repairs, home repairs, loss of housing, public assistance issues, loss of
child support, and banking issues are among the most common shock
events experienced by EITC recipients. Eighty-five percent of respon-
dents in this sample reported experiencing at least one of these shock
events; the majority of respondents experienced two or more.
Prior to welfare reform, families could turn to welfare for tempo-
rary financial relief in the case of a shock event.157 Now, policies have
changed such that the public safety net of welfare is no longer avail-
able for families who have “timed out” of welfare and is more limited
and stigmatized for families who have not timed out.158 What has not
changed, and in fact has worsened, is the fragility of the financial posi-
tion of low-income families. Most of these families live paycheck to
paycheck, making just enough (or in many cases not enough) to pay
their bills, keep their apartments, and provide basic necessities for
their children.159
For these families, one unexpected shock event can derail years
of hard work toward the slow climb out of poverty. As these families
have transitioned to work, they have become even more vulnerable
because welfare was, for the most part, stable income, even when
financial shocks occurred. Now, as workers, when a shock event
results in job loss, their income will often crash to zero. Few of them
have the savings necessary to weather such an event.160 Indeed, over
three-quarters of low-income working families are asset poor,
157 See supra Parts II.B–C, III (discussing how welfare reform tightened eligibility
requirements and how the public discourse surrounding welfare and the increasing stigma
associated with it post-reform made respondents less likely to seek welfare as a safety net);
see also Stephen D. Sugarman, Income Security when Temporarily Away from Work, in
SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, SHARED RISK: GOVERNMENT, MARKETS, AND SOCIAL POLICY
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 102, 109–10 (Jacob S. Hacker & Ann O’Leary eds., 2012)
(noting that people can turn to welfare during times when they are temporarily without
income but that both “stigma and . . . sharply reduced living standards . . . usually accom-
pany welfare enrollment”).
158 See supra notes 83–86 and accompanying text (describing the effect of legislative
reforms in 1996 that imposed strict time limits and participation requirements on welfare
enrollment); supra Part III (detailing survey respondents’ moral aversion toward reliance
on welfare, consistent with anti-welfare rhetoric pervasive in political and media discourse
in the 1990s).
159 See Sykes et al., supra note 116, at 16 (finding, based on analysis of portions of the
data used in this article, that respondents’ wages covered only 67.9% of monthly
expenditures).
160 See MICHAEL S. BARR, NO SLACK 180 (2012) (“[L]ow- and moderate-income (LMI)
households have insufficient income or assets to overcome the financial difficulties that
come their way. Put another way, they have no slack.”).
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meaning that they do not have “enough assets to finance consumption
for three months at the federal income poverty level.”161 Without a
financial cushion, many families are vulnerable to even one unex-
pected financial shock—a car breaking down, a broken leg, a sick
child who needs someone to stay with them, a divorce, or a job loss—
just to name a few.
Some respondents simply timed out of welfare and no longer
qualified for it due to the new lifetime time limits. This is particularly
a problem for older respondents. Cultural constraints also prevented
many respondents from seeking out welfare. As discussed above, the
mantra of independence and self-sufficiency that was so important to
the passage of welfare reform permeates the thinking of low-income
families.162 The pride and independence of being a worker found by
previous studies163 was reflected in responses both among former wel-
fare recipients and those who have never been on welfare.
Respondents felt a sense of self-respect and dignity, and that they
were closer to their dream of middle-class status than they were on
welfare. Thus, when respondents experienced a financial shock, they
tried to avoid welfare because it was embarrassing, and it meant
admitting to themselves and others that they failed. Suddenly middle-
class status seems less attainable than ever, and the pride they felt
diminishes the moment they step into the welfare office. Respondents
had created psychological boundaries between themselves and others
who have to seek direct income from the government in the form of
welfare, and they created an identity based on the fact that they no
longer need such help.
When families experience a shock event, the structural con-
straints of the new welfare system’s rules and regulations, coupled
with the cultural discourse around welfare, have contributed to the
low percentage of families who rely on welfare when they experience
a financial shock. In this sample, only 7% of respondents who
161 Signe-Mary McKernan & Caroline Ratcliffe, Enabling Families to Weather
Emergencies and Develop: The Role of Assets 1 (The Urban Inst., Working Paper No. 7,
2008), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=411734. If only liquid assets are taken
into account, then almost 80% of low-income working families are asset poor. Id. If net
worth is considered, the numbers are a bit better but still troubling, as approximately 45%
of low-income working families are asset poor. Id.
162 See supra notes 87–97 and accompanying text (describing the policy concerns ani-
mating welfare reform under the Clinton Administration); supra notes 129–50 and accom-
panying text (describing respondents’ moral aversion toward welfare).
163 See KATHERINE S. NEWMAN, NO SHAME IN MY GAME: THE WORKING POOR IN THE
INNER CITY, at xv (1999) (arguing that the working poor find dignity and pride in earning a
paycheck, even when working jobs that most of society deems unworthy).
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experienced a shock event reported that they turned to welfare in
their attempt to weather it.
B. The New “Private Safety Net”: Staying Afloat with Credit Cards
With welfare participation dwindling and families making the
choice to “depend on [themselves],”164 the question becomes: How do
families stay afloat when they experience a financial shock? In other
words, what is the fabric of the new safety net?
Former President Clinton and other proponents of the EITC
would like to believe that the EITC is the answer.165 Indeed, when
families experienced a shock event around the time they received the
EITC, they typically used their refund money to weather it. Some
families are able to put off the consequences of their shock event just
long enough to use the EITC as a buffer and, thus, avoid catastrophe.
Respondents reported using the EITC to cope with 16% of the finan-
cial shocks they experienced. One respondent was facing eviction
after her drug-addicted boyfriend drained their bank accounts. She
said that when she got the EITC, “[A]ll I was thinking about was sur-
vival. All I was thinking about was what do I need to do to save this
family from eviction. . . . I was so thankful that we were eligible,
because I knew that that was going to keep us out of eviction
court.”166
For most families, however, the timing of shock events does not
align with tax return season—and thus, they do not have EITC money
at their disposal. In that situation, many reported using credit cards as
a buffer to get by until they received their tax return.167 For these
families, because the EITC is generally received only once per year, it
is most effective in paying off debt that has accumulated due to a
shock event, rather than actually weathering the shock itself. At this
point, however, late fees and interest have already accumulated,
making the debt more difficult to pay off and thus requiring a larger
portion of the tax credit to be spent on debt. The EITC is used to help
pay off this interest and fees at the expense of savings and mobility.
Then, the next year, there are no savings left when another shock
event happens, and the cycle continues.
164 Interview with Respondent 56 (Aug. 22, 2007).
165 See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text (noting that President Clinton dis-
cussed the EITC as a positive replacement for welfare).
166 Interview with Respondent 97 (Oct. 14, 2007).
167 Among respondents who had credit card debt at the time of the interview, the
average amount was $4638. Laura Tach & Sara Sternberg Greene, “Robbing Peter to Pay
Paul”: Economic and Cultural Explanations for How Low-Income Families Manage Debt
11 (Dec. 20, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the New York University Law
Review).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\88-2\NYU201.txt unknown Seq: 34 19-APR-13 14:12
548 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:515
The relationship between low-income families and credit cards is
a relatively new one. At about the same time that welfare reform
passed, another major financial transformation for low-income fami-
lies was happening: State usury laws that protected customers from
excessively high interest rates were weakened.168 This, in turn,
allowed lenders to extend credit to riskier borrowers while utilizing
higher interest rates to make up for the increased risk.169 Credit card
companies targeted low-income families who would not have qualified
for credit cards before.170 Lenders engaged in higher risk consumer
lending because deregulation made such lending profitable.171 Indeed,
between 1989 and 2001, consumer credit card debt among Americans
almost tripled,172 and credit card debt among very low-income fami-
lies grew by 184%.173
Outreach to low-income families was evident from the finances of
the respondents. Over 94% of respondents had an outstanding bill or
debt at the time of their interviews, and almost 60% of the respon-
dents had outstanding credit card debt.174 Respondents attempted to
cope with financial shocks by using credit cards (as at least one of
their coping strategies) for almost 70% of the shock events they
experienced.175
The use of credit cards far exceeded any other coping strategy.
For 35% of shock events, respondents turned to family and friends for
help, for 16% they relied on the EITC, for 8% they sought out
168 Katherine Porter, Driven by Debt: Bankruptcy and Financial Failure in American
Families, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 6, at 1, 4.
169 See David A. Lander, “It ‘Is’ the Best of Times, It ‘Is’ the Worst of Times”: A Short
Essay on Consumer Bankruptcy After the Revolution, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 201, 204–05
(2004) (noting that advances in credit scoring allowed companies to lend profitably even to
high-risk borrowers).
170 Littwin, supra note 32, at 453. As Katherine Porter notes, these changes in credit
regulation also meant substantially increased debt for middle-class Americans. Porter,
supra note 168, at 5.
171 Lander, supra note 169, at 204–05.
172 TAMARA DRAUT & JAVIER SILVA, DE¯MOS, BORROWING TO MAKE ENDS MEET: THE
GROWTH OF CREDIT CARD DEBT IN THE ’90S 9 (2003), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/
files/publications/borrowing_to_make_ends_meet.pdf.
173 Id. at 10.
174 Tach & Greene, supra note 167, at 10–11, 34. Credit card debt was the most common
type of non-investment debt of the sample. Id.
175 Each shock event was recorded as a separate event with a separate coping strategy.
This number was calculated by counting each time a respondent indicated that they used a
credit card to cope with a shock event. Some respondents used credit cards to cope with
multiple shock events, and each use was counted as a separate credit card event.
Additionally, some respondents used multiple coping strategies to deal with individual
shock events. Each coping strategy was recorded and counted. Sixty percent of the sample
reported having credit cards, so families with credit cards disproportionately used them to
cope with shock events.
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unemployment insurance, for 7% they turned to welfare, and for 2%
they sought out help from private charities.
Reliance on credit cards is not surprising because credit cards
“provide a fast, easy, stigma-free way” of coping with most financial
emergencies.176 Credit cards are particularly useful for families
because timing is often so important to them. The majority of the
respondents in this study live from paycheck to paycheck and have no
savings. If a financial shock occurs that requires immediate action,
credit cards can quickly help them avoid financial disaster.
Credit cards provide many advantages over most other alterna-
tives to coping with shock events. Family and friends are generally less
reliable than credit cards because community networks of low-income
workers tend to be low-income themselves and are therefore often
resource-deprived.177 Even if networks want to help, they do not
always have money to lend; and even if they do, it may take them
some time to access the money. Additionally, asking for money from
family and friends is sometimes associated with shame and embarrass-
ment because it means admitting to the family member or friend that
one is in need and cannot provide for oneself.178 Many respondents
talked about avoiding asking for help at all costs. As one respondent
said, “I try not to borrow or I don’t—well, I don’t like to borrow
anyway. I mean that would be the last option that I opt out to is
asking someone else. . . . I’d rather wait or try to wait out and see if I
can find another way . . . .”179
Furthermore, credit cards are preferable to seeking help from pri-
vate charities or public aid because of the stigma and shame associ-
ated with asking these organizations for help.180 I found that many
respondents in this study sought to avoid this stigma at all costs. Using
a credit card does not entail any stigmatization since respondents per-
ceive that people of all income levels use credit cards.
Credit cards also provide advantages over less stigmatized uni-
versal aid programs, such as unemployment insurance. The rules of
unemployment insurance make it difficult for low-income workers to
176 Littwin, supra note 32, at 458; see also Kevin T. Leicht, Borrowing to the Brink:
Consumer Debt in America, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS, supra
note 6, at 195, 205 (“Credit card debt is a particularly useful substitute for wages because it
can be used to meet everyday or large-ticket expenses.”).
177 Littwin, supra note 32, at 460.
178 Id. at 461.
179 Interview with Respondent 163 (Sept. 25, 2007).
180 Littwin, supra note 32, at 461.
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obtain it.181 Even if they are eligible, public aid programs often
require documentation of eligibility and consequently long waiting
periods to get the money.182 As one respondent said, “I get unemploy-
ment during the summer because we get laid off and sometimes I have
to wait a couple, almost four weeks for unemployment to kick in.”183
Emergencies mean the insured often cannot endure these wait
periods, and the only way to avoid disaster is to obtain cash (or credit)
quickly. Credit cards are also preferable to government programs and
charities because such programs are often targeted to specific shock
events, such as unemployment or medical emergencies; other shock
events, such as a car repair (necessary for transportation to work) fall
outside of aid programs.184 Credit cards can be used for many dif-
ferent unexpected shock events.185
Respondents recognized the utility of credit cards for emergen-
cies, and several held on to credit cards for just that purpose. When
asked about credit cards, typical responses included: “I have one
major credit card that if anything should go wrong, but otherwise I
don’t use them”;186 “Mm, mm. You said owe on it now? Uh, uh,
I don’t try to use it unless it’s an emergency”;187 and, “It’s not good. I
think for emergencies that’s nice to have one or two.”188
Some respondents were able to keep these “emergency” cards
relatively free of debt, but many had used them for emergencies and
now owed significant money, fees, and interest. For example, one
respondent urgently needed dental work. She did not have dental
insurance so she “took out a credit card for [her] dental.”189 She now
spends $70 each month to try to pay off the credit card debt.190 This
181 See Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 19, at 308 (noting
that entitlement programs such as unemployment insurance “contain hidden conditions
and rules that disproportionately exclude low-income workers”).
182 See Littwin, supra note 32, at 459–60 & 459 n.29 (noting the extensive documenta-
tion requirements and the remaining possibility of denial even for those meeting the
requirements).
183 Interview with Respondent 89 (Sept. 1, 2007).
184 Littwin, supra note 32, at 461.
185 Id. at 462.
186 Interview with Respondent 57 (Sept. 12 & 26, 2007).
187 Interview with Respondent 173 (Sept. 7, 2007).
188 Interview with Respondent 40 (July 1, 2007).
189 Interview with Respondent 23 (July 16, 2007).
190 Id. A few respondents talked about being able to work out deals to put off paying for
expensive financial shocks until they received their EITC. One respondent’s husband
worked out a deal with his dentist that allowed him to get the dental work and then pay it
off when he received his refund: “[H]e owed dental for . . . a top plate. That was three
hundred he owed for that. The guy . . . took the insurance money and the three hundred
[my husband] had to pay he waited until we got our taxes and we paid him back.”
Interview with Respondent 59 (June 27, 2007). Unfortunately, most creditors are not
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situation was typical, as 88% of respondents who had credit cards
owed some amount of money on them at the time of the interview.
Another respondent and her husband have an “emergency
card”191 and owed money on it after using it for a shock event that did
not occur during tax refund season. They described their efforts to
keep the card debt-free, but the reality of frequent emergencies made
this difficult. They were trying to pay down the balance, however, so
that credit would be available in case they needed it.192 In the fol-
lowing dialogue with the interviewer, the respondent explained this
struggle:
Interviewer: So what kind of things does he put on his credit card?
Or you guys?
Respondent: We just use it for an emergency.
. . .
Respondent: He keeps it for like . . . one of the kids gets sick and we
need a prescription. We have the open money there. . . . Yeah.
That’s just an emergency card. Otherwise we have no other credit
cards.
Interviewer: You don’t, OK. Do you know what the credit limit is on
that card?
Respondent: Three hundred dollars.
. . .
Interviewer: OK, and what’s the balance?
Respondent: It’s probably about . . . I’m gonna say two, probably
like two thirty now, cause he just mailed them a payment and he
used it in June, so . . . .
. . .
Interviewer: OK, so he’s trying to pay down the balance.
Respondent: Yeah, that way if we need something it’s open.
. . .
Respondent: And we don’t want to ask for any, any more credit,
because we can’t afford it.193
For many respondents, the EITC is the way they are able to pay
off these debts, and they depend on the lump sum of the EITC to do
so. As one respondent said, “I love the lump sum because something
always happens. You always need your tax return.”194 Indeed, 84% of
respondents in this study used their EITC refund to pay off bills and
willing to work out arrangements like this. Typically, if someone cannot pay in the bill
period, interest begins to accumulate.
191 Interview with Respondent 56 (June 27, 2007).
192 Id.
193 Interview with Respondent 59 (June 27, 2007).
194 Interview with Respondent 44 (July 2, 2007).
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debts.195 Families who spent refund dollars on debt reduced their debt
burdens by almost 50%.196 In some cases, these debts and back bills
were the result of a shock event, and the EITC allowed respondents to
pay off the debt, fees, and interest and to prevent them from further
accumulation:
Interviewer: [Y]ou mentioned that this year one of the things you
used your refund check was for paying back the credit card bill. . . .
[W]hat did you charge to the Visa card?
Respondent: Hmm, probably like, car repair.
Interviewer: Your car repair was on there?
. . .
Respondent: It was a major car repair.
Interviewer: And um, so [you just charged it to] the credit card.
Respondent: Mhmm [yes].
Interviewer: And then were you paying it off little by little?
Respondent: Yep, little by little.
Interviewer: And then you just paid off the whole rest of it [with the
EITC]? That must have felt good to get off?
Respondent: Yep, yep. Because you don’t want to tack yourself
much for interest rate, you know?197
C. The Dangers of Getting By on Credit
Ruby Mendenhall and colleagues have noted how private, for-
profit tax preparation company offices such as H&R Block have in a
sense become the new, “privatized” welfare claim office.198 There is a
related role for credit card companies as a kind of new, private, wel-
fare provider. Throughout the year, credit card companies pay out
money, and in return they get interest and fees, which the government
is indirectly paying to them through the EITC.199
195 Mendenhall et al., supra note 25, at 367. Another study of EITC recipients found
that among recipients who spent some or all of their refunds (91%), nearly 80% used their
refunds to pay down bills or other debts. Michael S. Barr & Jane K. Dokko, Tax Filing
Experiences and Withholding Preferences of Low- and Moderate-Income Households:
Preliminary Evidence from a New Survey , in RECENT RESEARCH ON TAX
ADMINISTRATION AND COMPLIANCE: SELECTED PAPERS GIVEN AT THE 2006 IRS
RESEARCH CONFERENCE 204 (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06barr.pdf.
196 Tach, supra note 90, at 39. For a more detailed discussion of planned refund alloca-
tions, see Mendenhall et al., supra note 25, at 372–74.
197 Interview with Respondent 38 (July 19, 2007).
198 See Mendenhall et al., supra note 25, at 371 (“[I]t is not the welfare office but the
for-profit tax preparer that nearly 70% of EITC claimants approach to obtain benefits.”
(citations omitted)).
199 Of respondents with credit card debt, 39% used a portion of the EITC to pay an
average of 22% of their credit card debt (and the average credit card balance of respon-
dents with some amount of credit card debt was $4638). Other respondents may have
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On one hand, this role for credit card companies is admirable.
Credit cards can save low-income workers from spiraling immediately
into severe financial hardship and potentially losing their homes.
Indeed, credit card companies have called the changes in high-risk
lending the “democratization of credit.”200 However, the story is not
as positive as it may appear on its face, and we are only beginning to
see the fallout.
Those with annual family incomes of less than $10,000 saw the
largest proportional increase in credit card debt between 1989 and
2001—increasing by 184%.201 During the 1990s, Americans with
incomes below the poverty level nearly doubled their credit card
usage, and those with family incomes between $10,000 and $25,000
came in a “close second.”202 Low-income borrowers who cannot pay
the full amount of their bill are enormously profitable for credit card
issuers.203 As commentators have noted, “[i]nterest payments account
for more than 80% of the profits of credit card issuers, with the
remaining 20% coming from annual fees, late fees, over-limit fees, and
merchant fees.”204 This statistic is troubling because low-income fami-
lies have seen a tremendous increase in credit card debt in recent
decades. At least in part to solicit more of these borrowers, and thus
increase profits, credit card issuers have sent out billions of solicita-
tions.205 Credit card companies sent out 1.52 billion direct mail solici-
tations in 1993, and by 2001 this number jumped to 5 billion
soliciations.206
The relationship between credit and low-income households
poses several unique difficulties. Scholars have offered innovative
solutions to try to find ways to continue to extend credit to these
households while shielding them from some of the most aggressive
predatory techniques of credit card companies.207 These conversations
considered paying off at least part of their credit card debt, but a more pressing expense
got in the way. For these families, their interest and fees continue to accumulate.
200 Henry J. Sommer, Causes of the Consumer Bankruptcy Explosion: Debtor Abuse or
Easy Credit?, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 33, 37 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted).
201 DRAUT & SILVA, supra note 172, at 9–10.
202 TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 136–37 (2000).
203 Sommer, supra note 200, at 38.
204 SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 202, at 135.
205 See DRAUT & SILVA, supra note 172, at 37 (“During the 1990s, the credit card com-
panies sent billions of solicitations . . . to attract new customers.”); Sommer, supra note
200, at 37–38 (noting that the increase in solicitation was driven by an increase in the
profitability of the credit card business, which was due in part to the ability to target low-
income, high-risk persons).
206 DRAUT & SILVA, supra note 172, at 13. 
207 See, e.g., Littwin, supra note 32, at 478–79, 485–88 (advocating alternative products
called “self-directed credit cards,” a form of which would enable credit card users to place
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are important and, in the long term, may be a key solution to helping
low-income families weather shock events.
However, in this Article, I focus on what the data from my study
tell me: Many low-income borrowers who receive the EITC are on a
road to financial disaster. Some respondents had stories of exper-
iencing a shock event, using a credit card as a buffer, and then paying
off the credit card debt with the EITC.208 These respondents lose a
critical percentage of their EITC to interest and fees instead of using
the money for mobility goals, but the credit card allows them to
weather the shock event.
Unfortunately, this is not the case for everyone. Another respon-
dent, a forty-nine-year-old grandmother, had no family network sup-
port available when she found out her four-year-old custodial
granddaughter needed open-heart surgery. She took off six weeks
from work to care for her granddaughter. However, she had no money
saved to cover expenses and no one to turn to for help, so she accumu-
lated a lot of credit card debt to get by. This respondent was
attempting to deal with this debt at the time of the interview, but did
not have the money to pay it back and was receiving threatening let-
ters from collectors. She said:
So I don’t know, but if you all are gonna have a training about con-
solidating your credit, let me know. I really will. I mean it’s not that
I don’t want to pay them, but it’s no sense in lying. And then they
send me threatening letters like they’re gonna take me to court. I
wrote one back, take me, I’ll be there. I will, I can’t lie to them, I
don’t have it, what do you want me to do. I had to take off work for
like six weeks because when my grandbaby had open-heart surgery.
I don’t know where you all want me to get the money from. Yeah,
my mother say you can’t get blood from a turnip so there’s nothing I
can give them, you know.209
As low-income families provide high profits to the credit industry
because they provide interest and fees revenue,210 their own finances
binding restrictions on their spending and borrowing in advance of actually using the card);
RONALD J. MANN, CHARGING AHEAD 207 (2006) (advocating, among other things,
“[i]nvalidating legal obstacles to credit card surcharging,” “[i]nvalidating unpriceable con-
tract terms like universal default provisions,” “[s]hifting disclosure regimes to the point-of-
sale,” “[s]etting mandatory minimum repayment levels,” and “[s]ubordinating the debt of
credit card lenders in cardholder bankruptcies”).
208 See supra note 197 and accompanying text (describing respondent’s experience using
credit cards as a buffer).
209 Interview with Respondent 34 (Aug. 15, 2007).
210 See DRAUT & SILVA, supra note 172, at 13 (“[Late fees are] the fastest growing
source of revenue for the industry, jumping from $1.7 billion in 1996 to $7.3 billion in
2001. . . . The credit card industry’s punitive practices have paid off. . . . Pretax return on
assets, a key measure of profitability, averaged 4.2% in 2002, the highest level since 1988.”)
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often begin to fall apart and they find themselves deep in debt,
without a way out.211 Many respondents found themselves in this posi-
tion when they experienced a shock event and then used credit cards
to pay for many of their daily expenses for a period of time.
Respondents eventually rack up such overwhelming debt, interest,
and fees that their EITC can only cover some of it.
Many of the respondents in this study had short credit histories,
and they were just beginning to navigate the consequences of massive
debt. The stigma of welfare offices may have been in their past, but in
its place were calls from collection agencies, threats, and eventually
lawyers, courtrooms, and looming potential bankruptcy. One respon-
dent talked about changing her phone number to try to avoid
collectors:
So I ended [up] changing my cell phone for them to stop calling me,
because like I keep telling them, like you guys don’t have to be so
rude. You’re calling to get your money. You don’t have to be rude
to me, that’s gonna make [me] not want to pay you even more, so I
just changed the number to refrain from arguing . . . . I said, lady, I
don’t have the money right now. I don’t know what to tell you guys.
When I get it, you’ll get it. Trust me, because I want you to leave me
alone . . . .212
The possibility of bankruptcy was on the mind of some respon-
dents, though they often said they would simply ignore the debt and
hope it did not come to that. One respondent’s reasoning was typical:
“I got [a credit card] but I’m not paying it yet. . . . I might owe, shoot, I
might owe seven hundred on it but I’ll be filing bankruptcy before I
pay it.”213 Several of the respondents did not entirely understand the
interest and fees on their credit cards when they used them to weather
a shock event, and they were angry they now owed so much. One
respondent talked about using her Queen Latifah card to get out of a
bind, but then owing hundreds of dollars in interest and fees, money
she did not realize she would owe:
Respondent: That’s that Queen Latifah chick, I wanna see her. And
the three hundred dollar credit card, I only got a hundred. She took
out all the fees with the other one, with that credit card. What was
it, a hundred dollars, eighty-five dollars annual fee, this fee and that
211 Admittedly, many families find themselves in this situation not just because they use
credit cards for emergencies. There are psychological and practical reasons many people
use credit cards for daily expenses. For further discussion of these issues, see generally
Littwin, supra note 32, at 464–66, in which the author notes that many low-income women
she interviewed obtained and used credit cards because they symbolized being a part of
mainstream society.
212 Interview with Respondent 78 (Aug. 15, 2007).
213 Interview with Respondent 102 (July 29, 2007).
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fee and then they only got a hundred dollars, and now you tell me I
owe you five thousand dollars. You better ask CoverGirl to give it
to you, for real.
Interviewer: What do you mean, what is this, is she in some credit
card commercial?
Respondent: No, it’s a Queen Latifah credit card, that’s what they
tell you. Yeah, to make black people buy it, get it. And I did.
. . .
Respondent: Yeah! Yeah, she bamboozled me, yeah. That’s why I
say CoverGirl better pay her, mmhmm, because if I go to court I’m
giving her back three hundred dollars, she ain’t getting no five
thousand.214
Credit cards are an important part of the new safety net for low-
income families, who use them when shock events hit. In the short
term, they work. The problem, however, is that many low-income
families are not able to pay off the debt on the cards once interest and
late fees accumulate. Because credit cards have only been widely
available to low-income populations for the last fifteen years, we have
yet to see the full consequences of this expansion. Bankruptcy rates
may soar as more low-income families join those who file.215
214 Interview with Respondent 34 (Aug. 15, 2007). Queen Latifah, an actress, singer, and
rapper, promoted the Urban Television Network’s Freedom Card, which was issued from
2000 to 2001. See Freedom Card, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 432 F.3d 463, 466 (3d Cir.
2005). “The majority of FREEDOM CARD customers had credit lines of $300. On
average, they were charged annual fees and interest amounting to 140% over and above
their principal balance.” Id. Queen Latifah also promotes CoverGirl cosmetics. See Queen
Latifah, COVERGIRL, http://www.covergirl.com/talent/queen-latifah (last visited Oct. 24,
2012).
215 Elizabeth Warren has shown that when indicia of class status other than income—
such as education, occupation, and home ownership—are used, most bankruptcy filers as
of 2001 were not the working poor, but rather people who were middle class. ELIZABETH
WARREN & AMELIA TYAGI WARREN, THE TWO INCOME TRAP 7 & n.12 (2003) (citing
Elizabeth Warren, Financial Collapse and Class Status: Who Goes Bankrupt?, 41 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 115 (2003)). Consistent with these findings, many respondents in this study
talked about potentially having to file for bankruptcy, but only five respondents had actu-
ally filed. However, since low-income workers are relatively new to credit cards, there may
be changes in the demographics of those who file for bankruptcy as interest and late fees
continue to accumulate for low-income families over time.
There is no clear explanation for why bankruptcy filers are largely middle-class
Americans as opposed to poor Americans. However, there is reason to believe that as the
poor rack up more credit card debt, they may be driven to file. See Brian K. Bucks, Out of
Balance? Financial Distress in U.S. Households, in BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE
MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 6, at 40, 58 (comparing people who file for bankruptcy against
people who do not and finding that “[t]hose in bankruptcy tend to have lower net worth
and greater debt compared not only with U.S. families overall, but also with non-bankrupt,
financially vulnerable families”). Bucks also found that those who file for bankruptcy have
substantially higher unsecured debt than non-filers, as well as comparatively higher
unsecured debt as a proportion of total outstanding debt. Id. at 53. If lower income families
do begin to file for bankruptcy in higher numbers, we may find that they begin spending
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Exacerbating the problem for these families, Congress recently
made bankruptcy more expensive, and more difficult to file for, by
passing the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection
Act of 2005.216 Low-income families may be left with few alternatives
and few public or private safety nets available. In the short term,
access to credit cards provides them with important financial relief
and the ability to remain above water—but in the long term, families
may find themselves drowning in debt.
D. A Fast Descent: When There Is No Credit
For some families, the lack of a public safety net means more
immediate consequences. Several respondents217 said they had sworn
off credit cards due to past bad experiences with them.218 One respon-
dent described a bad experience with credit cards and then told us:
I had one, I had one from J.C. Penney and I had got so behind in
that and they harassed me and harassed me. I paid that sucker off
and I didn’t ever get another one. I never got another one . . . . I
said I will never in life deal with another credit card, and I didn’t.219
Respondents who have sworn off credit cards, like the respondent
above, will not have immediate access to a credit card when a shock
event occurs. Some other respondents will not have access to a credit
card because they have never had one (either intentionally or because
they did not qualify).220 For families in these situations, when a shock
event does not occur at tax-refund time, the resolve to maintain self-
sufficiency ultimately results in a downward spiral that leads to out-
comes such as homelessness.
For example, one respondent, her boyfriend, and her daughter
were living in a market-rate apartment. She worked at a coffee shop
part or all of their EITC refund on the filing and lawyer fees associated with bankruptcy.
Two scholars recently found that bankruptcy filings do indeed rise steadily during the first
third of the year but then remain relatively flat for the remaining part of the year. Ronald
J. Mann & Katherine Porter, Saving Up for Bankruptcy, 98 GEO. L.J. 289, 319 (2010).
After interviewing bankruptcy attorneys, they conclude that tax refunds largely explain
this annual filing pattern. Id. at 319–22.
216 Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C.).
217 Forty percent of respondents did not have a credit card at the time of the interview.
218 E.g., Interview with Respondent 18 (July 2, 2007) (“I learned my lesson. No credit
cards for me. [all laugh] Nothing! . . . We had bad credit.”); Interview with Respondent 17
(July 2 & Aug. 1, 2007) (“The mistake I made was that credit card, First Union in college—
SNIP. After the first semester I cut that bad boy. So I’m good.”).
219 Interview with Respondent 143 (July 26, 2007).
220 For some families the problem is not lack of access to a credit card, but rather that
credit cards were not enough to weather the shock events they experienced—often
because rent, their highest expense, could not be charged to a credit card.
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and her boyfriend was delivering pizza.221 At that time, she said,
“[W]e could afford everything like fine . . . . [W]e had money, every-
thing was paid, we had our phone and everything, we had a table,
everything was paid for.”222 However, things went downhill when the
respondent broke her leg. She had only a few sick days left at her job,
and she could not work at a coffee shop with a broken leg since she
had to be on her feet all day. About the same time, her boyfriend’s car
broke down. He depended on the car to get to work and make deliv-
eries, so they paid for it to be fixed. The respondent and her boyfriend
did not have credit cards, so they had to pay for the car repair in
cash.223
The combination of the loss of her income and the money spent
on car repairs left them unable to pay their rent and their landlord
served them an eviction notice. She applied for welfare (a require-
ment for qualifying for a shelter) and then lived in a shelter for over a
year and a half before getting off the waitlist for public housing. This
respondent and her boyfriend, who were working hard to make it on
their own, were derailed because of a broken leg, a car repair, and a
lack of readily available funds.224
Another respondent told a similar story, though her resistance to
welfare was front and center to her financial decline. This respondent
was working at a stable job when she became pregnant. She had preg-
nancy complications and had to stop working. She tried to make
things work herself, but as she said, “I came home one day from, I had
to go to court, they were taking us to eviction court and when I came
home from court, they had set all our stuff outside.”225 The respon-
dent did not have family she could live with, so she had to go to a
homeless shelter. At that point she went on welfare because she was
required to by the shelter and she was out of options. As she said, “I
was homeless, I was pregnant, I needed money.”226 However, she
described the process as “really degrading”227 and found work soon
after she gave birth. Though she still lived in transitional housing at
the time of the interview, she no longer received welfare. As she said,
“I got hired at [a grocery store] and I worked that and I stopped get-
ting [welfare] because I reported it.”228
221 Interview with Respondent 50 (July 30, 2007).
222 Id.
223 Id.
224 Id.
225 Interview with Respondent 118 (Oct. 24, 2007).
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id.
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A third respondent tells of a similar predicament. This respon-
dent worked for many years driving an airport shuttle before he
injured his shoulder and developed severe tendinitis from lifting lug-
gage every day. The respondent, his wife, and his five children had
been living in a rented house, with his income paying the rent and all
utilities. He tried to get reassigned to work that did not require lifting,
but instead, “they threw [him] out of the job.”229 He found informa-
tion about getting subsidized housing, but as he explained:
The priority was, I was living in a house. . . . [T]hey tell me you have
to be in shelter to get a house, subsidy houses . . . or Section 8. . . . I
don’t want the government. So I say no way I wanna go shelter.
The respondent resisted government help until he had no choice.
Indeed, he did not seek out a shelter right after he lost his job.
Instead, he kept trying to make it, until, “The landlord said OK, if you
don’t want to pay the rent, so I have to evict you. So he evict me and
we have to go court. I had to take the court’s table to the welfare
things. They put us shelter.”230 He was out of options. He and his
family were first put in a hotel, and then they were transferred to
another shelter. As the respondent said, “But it still does not feel
comfortable, because is temporary place and you couldn’t do certain
things, you know. Is strict rules, you know. It was all tough.”231
Perhaps the most important lesson he learned was this: “After all you
pay tax and all that, if you have a kid, I make suggestion, is it’s good to
get better help, you know, quick help instead of waiting years for
something like that. It is very tough to live shelter with the kids.”232
In sum, for families who experience financial shocks, the EITC is
sometimes just enough to smooth their financial position and keep
debt collectors away. They pay off some of their debt, but interest and
fees continue to accumulate on the debt they cannot pay off. In the
short term, the EITC is enough. In the long term, many of these fami-
lies may face bankruptcy or (in the case of homeowners) foreclosure.
They are living in a dangerous cycle of debt, interest, and fee accumu-
lation on credit cards, followed by an annual smoothing.
For other families who do not have access to credit cards, the lack
of other support can have dire consequences. Many of these families
have timed out of welfare, were not able to receive it quickly enough,
or did not seek it out because of cultural or psychological barriers
against doing so. They have no options and quickly fall into a spiral of
229 Interview with Respondent 58 (Oct. 23, 2007).
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 Id.
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financial despair and homelessness; it may take years to begin
rebuilding their financial lives.
V
REPAIRING THE SAFETY NET
A. What Is the Problem?
In many regards, the EITC is an ideal federal antipoverty pro-
gram. Although there are proposals and debates about whether and
by how much the EITC needs to be increased and exactly who should
receive it,233 overall the EITC has bipartisan political support and is
well-regarded by scholars.234 Additionally, unlike welfare, receiving
the EITC does not seem to carry stigma for its recipients.235 Even
more significantly, recipients overwhelmingly support the EITC,
reporting that it provides them with motivation to work, a feeling of
belonging and dignity, hope of mobility,236 and much needed financial
support to make ends meet.
It may appear that this support is enough. However, as discussed
in Part IV, the data from this study show that as the EITC has
replaced welfare both structurally (through significant declines in wel-
fare rolls due to strict new rules) and culturally (due to low-income
workers’ reluctance to seek out welfare because it triggers feelings of
shame and failure), the safety net for the poor has unraveled. The
EITC is helpful for families during financially stable periods,237 but
low-income families are particularly vulnerable to financial shocks.238
Families cannot control the timing of shock events, so when they
hit, credit cards are the most common way to cope with the increased
expenses. However, while credit cards provide a short-term buffer,
they lead to financial ruin for many low-income families. Because the
EITC comes in one annual payment, families who have experienced a
shock event have already accumulated significant debt, interest, and
fees. The tax money goes toward credit card payments instead of
233 See supra notes 106–10 and accompanying text (reviewing such debates and
proposals).
234 See supra note 106 and accompanying text (listing proposed reforms to the EITC).
235 See supra Part III (comparing views of the EITC with views of welfare).
236 For a detailed discussion of the psychological and motivational benefits of the EITC
based on this data, see Sykes et al., supra note 116, at 25–28.
237 See Timothy M. Smeeding, Katherine Ross Phillips & Michael O’Connor, The EITC:
Expectation, Knowledge, Use, and Economic and Social Mobility, 53 NAT’L TAX J. 1187,
1193 (2000) (noting that the lump sum EITC can provide workers with the opportunity to
build assets and improve economic social mobility).
238 See Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 19, at 308–11
(noting that low-income workers are more likely to leave or lose jobs because of illness or
family emergencies).
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savings, asset accumulation, or other socioeconomic mobility goals.
Other workers do not have credit cards as a temporary buffer, so
unless the shock event happens to correspond with tax-refund season,
they face years of financial rebuilding.
B. Existing Proposals for Change
1. The Advance EITC
One potential solution would bring back an IRS program called
the advance EITC, or AEITC, which allowed qualified taxpayers to
receive a portion of the credit in each paycheck during the year. The
taxpayer would submit a W-5 form to her employer, and the employer
would then add money to the take-home pay of the taxpayer. The
Education Jobs and Medicaid Funding Act of 2010 repealed the
Advance EITC.239 After December 31, 2010, workers could no longer
receive Advance EITC in their paychecks. President Obama sug-
gested this cut as part of his February 2009 budget proposal.240 The
White House cited the low take-up rate (less than 1%) of the AEITC
and said that the “budget proposes eliminating it, not because we
don’t support work incentives for low- and moderate-income workers,
but rather because that program simply does not work well.”241
The majority of the respondents in this study had not heard about
the AEITC,242 so perhaps enhanced promotional efforts for the
AEITC would have increased participation. Some commentators, like
Elaine Maag of the Tax Policy Center, argue that instead of ending the
program, the IRS could take steps to educate employers and workers
about the “benefits of a steadier income stream in alleviating house-
hold stresses.”243
However, when we asked families if they would be interested in a
program like the AEITC, they overwhelmingly told us that they
would prefer to receive the EITC as a lump sum—as they currently
239 Pub. L. No. 111-226 § 219, 124 Stat. 2403, 2403 (repealing 26 U.S.C. § 32(g)).
240 Press Briefing, The White House, Press Briefing by OMB Director Peter Orzag and
CEA Chair Christina Romer (Feb. 26, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Press-Briefing-by-OMB-Director-Peter-Orszag-and-CEA-Chair-Christina-Romer.
241 Id.
242 Tach, supra note 90, at 12 (“Very few families in our sample were aware of [the
AEITC] . . . . A handful of families told us that their employers had told them about this
opportunity, but by and large most had not heard anything about this from their
employers, their social networks, or their tax preparers.”).
243 Elaine Maag, Giving Up on the Advanced Earned Income Tax Credit, TAX POLICY
CENTER (Mar. 4, 2009, 5:24 PM), http://taxvox.taxpolicycenter.org/2009/03/04/giving-up-on-
the-advanced-earned-income-tax-credit.
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receive it.244 Findings from other studies of EITC recipients have
yielded similar results.245 Respondents liked the forced-savings aspect
of the EITC lump sum,246 and they were afraid that if they took an
advance on the money, they would ultimately owe the IRS money at
the end of the year. This concern is not unfounded, as most respon-
dents suffered frequent bouts of unemployment or underemployment
and fluctuations in their monthly incomes for an assortment of
reasons.
As Anne Alstott has explained, this raises a very difficult institu-
tional dilemma. Fluctuations in income and the short accounting inter-
vals of the advanced payment system could result in overpayment
during the year. Families would then have to pay back the overpay-
ment at the end of the year.247 While the overpayments may be rela-
tively small in absolute terms, the loss of a few hundred dollars can be
a significant hardship with profound consequences for a low-income
family.248 Families from the study were also concerned that their
refund might be garnished to pay other outstanding debts to the gov-
ernment such as child support, student loans, and back taxes, also
resulting in the need for repayment to the government.249
For example, one respondent worked as a medical coder filing
paperwork in a hospital billing office for several years until she was
fired a few months before her interview. She qualified for the EITC,
but was concerned that her refund would be garnished, because after
she lost her job, she had fallen behind on paying her student loans.
She said:
I pray that I don’t end up owing them [next year]. . . . I’m hoping to
at least bring home at least a thousand. . . . But then again it’s like
even if I get that much, maybe student loans—they will take it
away. . . . I mean I just hope and pray that I get more than
that . . . .250
244 Tach, supra note 90, at 12–13 (noting that almost all of the families in this sample
would prefer to receive the EITC in a lump sum rather than in periodic payments).
245 Barr & Dokko, supra note 195, at 204–05 (finding that about 80% of taxpayers
would like to withhold income in order to receive a larger lump sum); see also Damon
Jones, Information, Preferences, and Public Benefit Participation: Experimental Evidence
from the Advance EITC and 401(k) Savings, 2 AM. EC. J.: APPLIED EC. 147, 149 (2010)
(finding that even with reductions in information, administrative, stigma, and procrastina-
tion costs associated with the AEITC, recipients still actively forgo it, and that long-term
forced-savings motives are unlikely, and postulating that uncertainty or short-term forced-
savings motives may be part of the explanation).
246 Id.
247 Alstott, Limitations, supra note 18, at 581–83.
248 Id.
249 Tach, supra note 90, at 14.
250 Interview with Respondent 5 (Sept. 19, 2007).
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Respondents did not want to rely on their EITC refund, so
receiving it early and potentially owing the government money was
not a risk they were willing to take. In fact, their fear was so signifi-
cant that they would rather rack up large interest and fees on credit
cards than receive overpayment from the AEITC.
The most common reason for preferring the lump sum, however,
was that families were committed to using the EITC as a forced-
savings tool.251 In fact, many respondents strategically claimed zero
dependents on their tax forms to increase the size of their EITC
refunds. When these workers filled out their W-4 forms, they had the
opportunity to claim allowances for their dependents, spouses, and
themselves, which would reduce the amount withheld for taxes and
increase the size of their paychecks. However, employees have the
option to “claim zero.” By not claiming those personal allowances or
dependents on their W-4 forms, they have more money withheld from
each paycheck than necessary. This strategy increases the size of their
tax refund at the end of the year. By claiming fewer children than they
actually have, the workers pay more through the year than the taxes
they owe.
One respondent explained that she claimed zero deductions
because her tax refund is “like a savings account. I will have that
money back for sure.”252 This strategy did not come without sacrifice,
though, since some respondents experienced financial hardship and
went into debt while they were waiting for the refund to come. They
also did not receive any interest on these withholdings, which they
might have received from a different savings vehicle such as a bank
savings account.
Finally, many respondents also acknowledged that they probably
would not save if a small amount of extra money came in their
paychecks, so they preferred the lump sum. One respondent said,
“[E]ven if . . . I get my extra one hundred in [each] paycheck I won’t
save that one hundred dollars. I won’t save it. . . . I know at the end of
[the year] I will have that big five thousand . . . .”253 She explained,
“[I]f you file zero then more money they take out of you, and then
more money you get back at the end of the year. So that’s why now
I’ve been fil[ing] zero.”254
251 Barr and Dokko’s study yielded a similar finding. Barr & Dokko, supra note 195, at
204–05 (noting that approximately 80% of taxpayers “would like to use the withholding
system to save”); see also BARR, supra note 160, at 206 (noting that overwithholding is a
common phenomenon among low-income households).
252 Interview with Respondent 89 (Sept. 1, 2007).
253 Interview with Respondent 95 (Aug. 28, 2007).
254 Id.
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As Laura Tach noted, the fact that the respondents were willing
to forgo a payment in the present—essentially providing the
government with the equivalent of a “no-interest loan” until tax
time—shows just how motivated they are to save, even if that means
they must pay the government to save for them.255
Other analyses of these data find that EITC recipients do save
some of their refund in the long run, and planned to save even more
of it when they filed taxes. Respondents were surveyed about their
planned EITC allocations and 57% indicated they planned to save at
least part of their EITC.256 However, only 19.6% of respondents actu-
ally saved (an average of 6% of their EITC refunds).257 Steve Holt of
the Brookings Institution suggests a modified version of the AEITC
to better reconcile the desires of recipients with the reality of their
financial positions.258 He argues for a program in which EITC recipi-
ents would receive their EITC in periodic quarterly payments based
on predicted EITC eligibility from the IRS (instead of their
employers, like the AEITC).259 Holt believes that this option would
take into account the desire for forced savings by low-income families,
but would also help households with everyday needs and reinforce the
earned quality of the EITC.260 While Holt’s proposal might offer
some advantages over the AEITC, it is still plagued with some of the
same problems of both the AEITC and the EITC in its current form:
the strong recipient preference for a big lump-sum payment, the
potential for overpayment and the resulting tax burden,261 and the
lack of immediate support in cases of financial shock.
255 Tach, supra note 90, at 15.
256 Mendenhall et al., supra note 25, at 388 tbl.6.
257 Id. However, another EITC study found that about 50% of low- and moderate-
income individuals who received a tax refund saved all (9%) or part (42%) of their tax
refunds. Barr & Dokko, supra note 195, at 204.
258 Steve Holt, Beyond the Lump Sum: Periodic Payment of the Earned Income Tax
Credit, COMMUNITY INVESTMENTS, Spring 2009, at 26, 29–31, available at http://www.frbsf.
org/publications/community/investments/0905/Spring_2009.pdf.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 30.
261 Holt proposes addressing the repayment problem in two ways. First, he suggests a
maximum advance disbursement of 50% of the total anticipated credit. Second, he suggests
a potential “safe-harbor” for overpayment, arguing that if a taxpayer can demonstrate that
she is acting in good faith, the government should waive any repayment liability. Id. at 29.
This type of program would eliminate the repayment problem for EITC recipients, but it
presents other challenges such as bureaucratic coordination within the IRS, susceptibility
to fraud, and difficult-to-muster political support.
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2. Increasing the EITC Subsidy
The data show that many families who receive the EITC are
living on the brink of financial disaster. In the majority of cases, their
incomes did not cover their expenses.262 Some scholars have argued
that increasing the amount of the EITC would make families more
financially stable and presumably better equipped to weather financial
shocks.263 Proposals on how exactly to adjust the EITC vary, but the
basic idea of the proposals is the same: Most recipients would be given
more money and thus a greater ability to save for rainy days.
This type of proposal, on its face, seems appealing because it is
straightforward and there are few, if any, issues of paternalism.
Families do not have enough money—so, if it is politically and eco-
nomically feasible, we should provide them with more money. Most
families in this study were struggling and sometimes went without
food and other basic necessities. Increasing their EITC subsidy may
be part of the solution to ensure that these families have enough to
make ends meet.
While an increase in the EITC may help solve some problems for
families, they are unlikely to solve the problem of financial shocks. In
theory, receiving more money might mean the families could save
more money for a rainy day. In practice, however, many families who
planned to save their refunds ultimately ended up using much of the
money to pay off debt. Indeed, 72% of the respondents had plans (at
the time they filed their taxes) to use some of their refund to catch up
on debt, and in reality 89% (an additional 17%) did so.264 Most of the
respondents felt so pressed to meet financial obligations that while the
idea of putting aside a significant portion of their refund was
appealing, the expenses of everyday life and their accumulating debt
made saving seem unwise.265
Not only do respondents use the EITC to pay down accumulated
debt, but many of them also spend it on current consumption
(including shopping, groceries, things for their children, car purchase
or repair, vacation, and other expenses). Almost 92% of respondents
in this sample spent an average of about 50% of their EITC on some
type of current consumption.266 Families at very low income levels
262 See Sykes et al., supra note 116, at 16 (describing the financial situations of families
receiving EITC).
263 See supra note 106 (discussing proposals to change the EITC subsidy).
264 Mendenhall et al., supra note 25.
265 This is not to say that respondents did not save any of their refund. As noted in Part
V.B.1 above, 20% of the sample saved, on average, 6% of their total refund. Mendenhall
et al., supra note 25, at 45, tbl.6.
266 Id.
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face many unmet family needs, including clothing that fits, cars that
run, and furniture that is not falling apart. Respondents looked for-
ward to the EITC as a way to feel, at least for a few months, that they
were not lacking.267
Furthermore, behavioral economic research has found that it is
difficult to resist spending money—even without unmet material
needs—when it is easily available to spend.268 Research has also
found that saving works best when it is automatic.269 These spending
habits, combined with accumulating debts and unmet basic needs
facing most respondents as tax season approaches, suggest that simply
giving respondents a larger EITC would be unlikely to make a signifi-
cant difference in how they respond to shock events. I believe the
financial trajectories of low-income families would be better served if
the government directed money into accounts designed specifically to
help families cope with financial shocks, as discussed in Part VI below.
3. Solutions Outside of the EITC
a. Expansion and Creation of Targeted Programs
There are numerous proposals unrelated to the EITC that may
help families when they experience specific types of shock events. For
example, scholars have proposed different variations of paid family
leave,270 an expansion of unemployment insurance,271 and an expan-
sion of disability benefits for temporary disability leave.272 I have two
267 For a detailed discussion and supporting qualitative data on this effect, see Tach,
supra note 90, at 40–41.
268 See Sendhil Mullainathan & Eldar Shafir, Savings Policy and Decisionmaking in
Low-Income Households, in INSUFFICIENT FUNDS 121, 135 (Rebecca M. Blank & Michael
S. Barr eds., 2009) (“Keeping money in cash rather than in a bank increases the ability and
temptation to spend immediately, making it difficult to achieve any asset accumulation.”);
cf. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 47–49 (2008) (discussing methods
to curb the proclivity to spend money that is readily available).
269 Mullainathan & Shafir, supra note 268, at 124 (“[N]umerous studies of middle-class
savings show that, as a consequence of faulty planning and procrastination, saving works
best as a default.”).
270 See, e.g., Jeremy I. Bohrer, You, Me, and Consequences of Family: How Federal
Employment Law Prevents the Shattering of the “Glass Ceiling,” 50 WASH. U. J. URB. &
CONTEMP. L. 401, 418–21 (1996) (proposing a limited, paid family leave); Samuel
Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the Workplace: Accommodating the Demands
of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2214–20 (1994) (proposing an insurance model for
pregnancy leave); Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 1, 1–2 (2005) (evaluating and defending paid family leave); Erin P. Drew,
Comment, The Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation Experiment: Did the
Department of Labor Go Too Far?, 106 DICK. L. REV. 367, 387–88 (2001) (arguing that
Congress should either amend the Federal Unemployment Tax Act to provide for family
leave, or expand the Family and Medical Leave Act).
271 See, e.g., GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 27, at 202–03.
272 See, e.g., id. at 219–26 (proposing a plan for short term disability insurance).
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main concerns with these proposals. First, these programs would pre-
sumably require a waiting period to determine eligibility. As discussed
in Part IV.A, when respondents experience shock events, they often
need money right away. Waiting periods for unemployment insurance
and similar programs can drive respondents to simply use credit cards
when they need funds immediately. Additionally, as many of the
respondents in this study discussed, the eligibility requirements can be
confusing and difficult to meet.
The other, related concern about the aforementioned programs is
that they only target specific types of shock events. Even if they are
relatively inclusive, these programs do not typically cover all financial
emergencies. For instance, this study found that for low-income fami-
lies, even one seemingly small shock event—such as a car repair—can
derail a family just as much as an unexpected job loss, because the
smaller shock event can lead to job loss.273 Being able to ease the
financial shock before it leads to something more serious is much
more useful for families and ultimately saves the government money.
In many cases, targeted proposals serve important purposes but
would not tackle a wide variety of smaller-scale shock events. For
example, Anne Alstott’s proposal for Life-Planning Insurance would
benefit some of the respondents in this study.274 Her program pro-
poses to provide income support and social services to parents whose
children “require intensive, personal care due to a serious illness or
disability.”275 These challenges would otherwise drain the families’
resources for quite some time. In such cases, a plan to tackle smaller
shock events is unlikely to be enough, and a program like Alstott’s is
needed. However, Alstott’s plan is not well suited for tackling the
smaller shock events with big consequences that many respondents in
this sample experienced. There is a need for both types of programs—
they just serve different purposes.
Michael Graetz and Jerry Mashaw have also proposed several
plans to provide better security for low-income Americans.276 Their
complex proposals cover a wide breadth of areas, including but not
limited to: programs for improving health care,277 unemployment
273 See, e.g., supra notes 221–24 and accompanying text (explaining how a health emer-
gency led to larger financial shocks for one respondent).
274 For example, one respondent struggled when her son’s leukemia diagnosis required
an extended stay in the hospital. Interview with Respondent 70 (Aug. 16, 2007). Alsott’s
program would have provided this respondent with relief from the burden of balancing
work and her son’s care.
275 ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT 119 (2004).
276 GRAETZ & MASHAW, supra note 27, at 153.
277 Id. at 163–87.
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insurance,278 disability insurance,279 childcare,280 housing,281 and long-
term care insurance,282 among others. Many of their proposals would
benefit the overall financial situation of low-income EITC recipients.
However, they do not address the small financial shocks that can have
big consequences. People who lose their jobs need a better support
system than the one that exists, and Graetz and Mashaw make
headway in proposing an improved system. However, for many EITC
respondents in the sample, restructuring the unemployment insurance
program will not prevent unemployment resulting from financial
emergencies. Graetz and Mashaw’s programs would not pay for the
needed car repair, for example, that would continue to provide a low-
income worker transportation to work, and in turn allow the worker
to keep her job. The Graetz and Mashaw proposals do not address the
likelihood of small, devastating financial crises.
b. Hacker’s Universal Insurance
Jacob Hacker proposed a program he terms “Universal
Insurance”283 in response to the increasing economic insecurity many
Americans face.284 His program avoids narrowly targeting specific
shock events. Hacker argues that “families should have access to more
than the highly segmented programs that now characterize American
social protection—programs that not only leave glaring gaps but also
lack the ability to respond flexibly to a rapidly changing world of
risk.”285 However, Hacker’s program also targets those experiencing
“the most severe economic shocks.”286 To qualify, the deductible is
20% of income—so Universal Insurance provides benefits only if a
family’s income fell by more than 20% of what it was the year
before.287 Additionally, this 20% must be after benefits from other
public programs are taken into account.288 While the program would
278 Id. at 188–209.
279 Id. at 210–26.
280 Id. at 227–54.
281 Id. at 245–50.
282 Id. at 273–77.
283 JACOB S. HACKER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, UNIVERSAL INSURANCE: ENHANCING
ECONOMIC SECURITY TO PROMOTE OPPORTUNITY 8 (2006) [hereinafter HACKER,
UNIVERSAL INSURANCE], available at http://www.hamiltonproject.org/files/downloads_and
_links/Universal_Insurance_Enhancing_Economic_Security_to_Promote_Opportunity.pdf.
Universal Insurance would require a premium, a coinsurance rate that varies with family
income, and a deductible. Id.
284 HACKER ET AL., ECONOMIC SECURITY AT RISK, supra note 1, at 2.
285 Id. at 190.
286 HACKER, UNIVERSAL INSURANCE, supra note 283, at 14.
287 Id.
288 Id. at 4.
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help in the most severe of cases, it would be difficult for many respon-
dents in this study to qualify for most of the shock events they experi-
ence. Hacker’s program suffers from some of the problems of the
more targeted programs. It would not cover many of the seemingly
small shock events a family may experience: the bank overdraft fee,
the car repair, or the dental work—small problems that can snowball
into financial ruin. Respondents need something other than credit
cards to help them cover expenses from these relatively smaller finan-
cial shocks.
A fundamental problem with Hacker’s program is that it is tied
only to income decline, not unexpected expenses. Data from this
study shows that for many respondents, the loss of income comes later
in the cycle, after an initial unexpected expense hits. Families need a
way to smooth the initial financial shock before it leads to conse-
quences like job loss and the later loss of income that Hacker targets.
c. TANF Office Emergency Funds
Some state TANF programs provide emergency funds to families
to help keep them off welfare. For example, North Carolina’s program
Work First is focused on “self-sufficiency”289 and allows families only
two years to move through Work First.290 One of the strategies Work
First uses to keep families off welfare is “diversion,” under which
“qualifying families can get a one-time payment equivalent to up to
three months [sic] worth of cash Work First benefits, based on a needs
assessment by the county worker, Medicaid, child care and Food and
Nutrition Services, if eligible, and other supportive services.”291 This
program allows families to stay off welfare but still access emergency
money when needed. A nationwide program of emergency money
through welfare offices could be considered, but the program would
be unlikely to stop the cycle of emergency credit card use and interest
and fee build-up among low-income families.
One problem with Work First is that to determine eligibility and
need for funds, an assessment is conducted by a county worker. If the
waiting period is too long for this determination, the payment might
come too late to help families when they need money quickly. Even if
the eligibility determination period is relatively short, the larger
problem is that these programs are run through welfare offices. As we
saw in Part III, EITC recipients do whatever they can to avoid the
289 N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 108A-27 (West 2012).
290 Id. § 108A-27-1(a).
291 Work First, N.C. DIV. SOC. SERVS., http://www.ncdhhs.gov/dss/workfirst/ (last
updated Dec. 6, 2012).
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stigma of welfare offices. Though these emergency programs are not
specifically welfare, they still involve going to the welfare benefits
office and being scrutinized in the way many recipients want to avoid
at all costs. Many EITC recipients with access to credit cards—which
are quicker, easier, and not stigmatized—may choose to use them
rather than seek out these welfare-like emergency programs. It is
telling that only 7% of this sample turned to welfare to cope with a
shock event. While “timing out” of welfare may partially explain this
low percentage, as discussed in Part II.C, the strong cultural disap-
proval of welfare and the resulting desire to stay away from anything
associated with it may lead many recipients to other means of coping.
VI
DESIGN FRAMEWORK FOR PROPOSED SAVINGS AND
EMERGENCY FUND (SAEF) ACCOUNTS
A. The Proposal
My proposal is straightforward, and not totally unlike programs
that some EITC recipients already enroll in through their workplaces.
However, it could profoundly change the financial trajectory of low-
income families, particularly when they experience financial shocks.
The proposal has several key features, outlined in the following five
subparts.
1. Twenty Percent Withheld in SAEF Accounts, with Interest
The first part of my proposal is that the IRS automatically with-
hold 20% of every recipient’s EITC amount. Since the average EITC
refund is about $2770 for a family with children,292 and many families
receive the Child Tax Credit293 (and in many cases a state EITC on
top of that), the 20% figure still leaves a sizable amount of the refund
for receipt in a lump sum to be used however the family sees fit.294
The amount withheld would accumulate interest from the IRS at a
292 This was the average refund in 2009 for people with children. CTR. ON BUDGET &
POLICY PRIORITIES, supra note 149.
293 See 26 U.S.C. § 24(a)–(b) (2006) (allowing a $1000 tax credit per child, which is only
reduced for individuals earnings more than $75,000 and couples earning over $110,000);
§ 24(d)(1) (allowing for a partial refund).
294 Like many aspects of this proposal, this percentage is subject to adjustment. The best
method of implementing this proposal would be to conduct randomized trials with dif-
ferent groups of EITC recipients, varying many aspects (such as amount withheld, enroll-
ment methods, and bonus structure, among others). Too often changes to benefit programs
are implemented without proper trials to find optimal structures—I believe that such trials
are vital, no matter how much previous data the program changes are based on. Change
can have unintended consequences, and small-scale trials are an important way to identify
and make changes to avoid negative consequences.
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fixed rate set during program implementation and would provide a
substantial amount of money to serve as a temporary smoother during
a financial crisis. Recipients would receive a written letter at the time
their tax refund is processed that would explain that their money is
being stored in a Savings and Emergency Fund (SAEF) account and
that by leaving money in the account, they are accumulating interest.
They would be told specifically that the money is for emergencies, as
the name of the account indicates, and money from each year would
roll over and continue to accumulate interest. Additionally, recipients
would receive quarterly statements indicating the amount of money in
their account and the interest earned.
A key feature of my proposed SAEF accounts is the interest
recipients would receive. This is important both as a public welfare
tool to help low-income families accumulate savings for an emergency
fund, and also as a tool to provide an incentive for families to allow
even more of their refund to be withheld for this purpose. The more
money in the account and the more time it remains deposited, the
more interest earned. Written material sent to SAEF account holders
would clearly explain how interest works and provide concrete exam-
ples of how interest can increase savings.
2. Option to Increase Amount Withheld, with Government
Matching Funds
EITC recipients would be given the option to increase the per-
centage of their refund allocated to their SAEF accounts, up to a max-
imum of 40% of their refund. This increased allocation option would
show up directly on the EITC tax schedule. To encourage increased
allocation, the government would match the amount contributed at a
50% match rate. The matching funds would only be activated if the
amount above the initial 20% remained in the account at the end of a
twelve-month accounting period to discourage abuse of the pro-
gram.295 For example, consider a hypothetical EITC recipient, Violet,
with an EITC refund of $2000. If she decided to increase her contribu-
tion amount to 30%, the default 20% (in her case $400) would be
deposited into the account, in addition to another 10% (in her case
$200). If her SAEF account still had $200 or more in it (the amount
she contributed above the default 20%) at the time of her next tax
295 The concern about abuse is that a recipient could contribute an additional per-
centage above the initial 20% to receive the government matching funds, but then immedi-
ately withdraw the money, having only contributed the additional percentage to access the
matching funds and use it immediately for nonemergency purposes. Under my proposal, a
recipient could still withdraw the money after the initial twelve months, once the matching
kicks in, but since more time has passed this scenario is less likely.
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filing (roughly one year later), Violet would receive $100 from the
government into her account at that one-year mark. The $100 is the
match to the 10% she deposited above the default 20%.
Research suggests that offering such matching incentives would
be effective in encouraging increased allocations to the fund. One
study offered roughly 14,000 H&R Block clients in low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods matching incentives for IRA contri-
butions at the time of tax preparation.296 They found that higher
match rates significantly raised IRA participation and contributions.
Take-up rates were 3% for the control group, 8% in the 20% match
group, and 14% in the 50% match group.297 Further, average IRA
contributions for the 20% and 50% match groups were four to seven
times higher than those in the control group.298
3. Automatic Enrollment Structure
EITC recipients would be automatically enrolled in the SAEF
program. As discussed in Part VI.A.2, recipients would have the
option to increase the amount withheld up to 40%, but all recipients
would default into the 20% accounts. This aspect of the program is
based on social science research that suggests that even if SAEF
accounts are beneficial for recipients, without automatic enrollment,
take-up rates will likely be lower than desired.299 Research about
human behavior and finances finds that people often default to the
status quo.300 As Tufano and Schneider note, studies show that
296 Esther Duflo et al., Saving Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families:
Evidence from a Field Experiment with H&R Block, 121 Q.J. ECON. 1311, 1311, 1313
(2006). Duflo et al. argue that their findings suggest that clear and understandable pro-
grams for matching of savings and professional assistance could generate a significant
increase in contributions to retirement accounts, including among low- and moderate-
income households. Id. at 1313–14. Retirement savings are certainly important, but for
many families receiving the EITC, the immediate need for money to simply retain their
housing and have food available takes precedence. This is even more prevalent when these
families are experiencing a financial shock. Thus, I argue that a more flexible savings
account should be encouraged as a first savings tool. Families on the higher end of the
EITC earnings spectrum may ultimately use their accumulated SAEF account money for
retirement, but the money would be readily available without penalty if the family suffers a
shock event.
297 Id. at 1313.
298 Id. at 1313–14.
299 See id. at 1314 (describing an experimental program in which “[t]ake-up rates were
not only far below 100%, they never exceeded 20%, even among tax filers in the 50%
match group who had substantial refunds”). This concern is particularly important because
this program is new. The combination of an unknown program and the proclivity to default
to the status quo could mean great difficultly with enrollment unless the program were
specifically opt-out.
300 THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 268, at 7–8 (“For a host of reasons . . . people have
a strong tendency to go along with the status quo or default option.”); see also id. at 12–13,
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“[i]nertia makes us ‘go with the flow,’ continuing on the same course
or avoiding decisions, especially when faced with complex or
unpleasant choices. In savings processes where the inertial or default
behavior is ‘savings,’ saving increases.”301 Indeed, many companies
are changing their retirement plans to opt-out plans based on such
research.302 Studies of retirement accounts have found profound
enrollment differences in opt-out versus opt-in programs.303 One
study of retirement plans at three companies that adopted automatic
enrollment plans found that enrollment rates rose to 90%, versus pre-
vious rates of 20%–40% at six months’ tenure or 60% at thirty-six
months’ tenure.304 Without automatic enrollment, even with the
incentives that the SAEF program offers, the take-up rate for SAEF
may be very low.
4. Access to Funds Using SAEF Cards
Unlike retirement accounts and other common withholding pro-
grams, recipients would have almost immediate access to their SAEF
account money when needed, without penalty. They would all receive
a SAEF card, which would function much like a debit card but would
be presented to them as an “emergency” card. Unlike other social
welfare insurance programs, however, when a shock event hits, there
would be no requirement to “qualify” for use—having received the
EITC is the qualification.
In order to curb impulsive spending, recipients would have to call
a toll-free number (listed on the card) to activate it, and there would
be a twenty-four-hour waiting period for activation.305 The twenty-
four-hour waiting period is relatively short, allowing the funds to truly
be available for emergencies—unlike many other social welfare
programs such as unemployment insurance, under which initial
benefits can take months to arrive. The activation would stay valid for
two weeks and then deactivate. After deactivation, a new activation
35, 83 (discussing status quo bias); Mullainathan & Shafir, supra note 268, at 124 (noting a
“general reluctance to depart from the status quo, because the disadvantages of departing
from it tend to loom larger than the advantages of the alternatives”).
301 Peter Tufano & Daniel Schneider, Using Financial Innovation to Support Savers:
From Coercion to Excitement, in INSUFFICIENT FUNDS, supra note 268, at 157.
302 Id. at 157.
303 Id. at 157–58.
304 Id. at 158.
305 As Lee Anne Fennell discusses in her article, Willpower and Legal Policy, waiting or
cooling off periods are common policy tools because people often make different decisions
in the present than they would when informed both by their “present self” and “longer-run
self.” Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 91,
97–98 (2009). Waiting periods, Fennell notes, can “reduce impediments to intrapersonal
bargaining.” Id. at 98.
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call with the mandatory waiting period would be necessary. It is
important to note that the activation would not require a justification,
it would simply require an extra step before use of the card and a
short waiting period.
This easy access would discourage credit card use because SAEF
cards would have many of the same functions as credit cards—they
provide fast access to funds and are stigma-free. The card could be
used at any store (only when a PIN code is entered) and cash could
also be withdrawn through an ATM. It would not be possible to over-
draw while using the card because the request would simply be
rejected if a user attempted to withdraw (or use the card to spend)
more than the SAEF account contained.
The qualitative data from this project shows us that respondents
are motivated to avoid government programs such as welfare, even
when doing so is not rational.306 Credit cards are the default source of
help because of their ease of use and their many functions. Indeed, the
data from this study demonstrates that the financial shocks exper-
ienced by EITC recipients—as well as their needs after those
shocks—are diverse. For some recipients the most pressing need is
covering daily expenses during a time of unexpected loss of income;
for others it is covering the cost of the shock event. In contrast to
existing targeted programs (such as unemployment insurance), SAEF
cards are designed to be as flexible as possible to help quickly smooth
the costs of the shock event, so that it does not lead to financial hard-
ship. The ability to use SAEF cards to withdraw cash may appear
overly generous, but it is a direct response to a problem many respon-
dents raised: Rent cannot be paid with a credit or debit card. When
respondents experienced a shock event, they could let bills for certain
nonessential utilities such as internet, cable television, or telephone go
unpaid. The worst-case scenario was the service being turned off. But
just a few months of unpaid rent could result in eviction proceedings
and complete financial upheaval. Moving to a homeless shelter could
mean losing a job if transportation from the shelter was difficult or the
job required working a nightshift—which many shelters do not allow.
Rent is thus one of the most essential, yet often one of the most diffi-
cult, expenses to cover when a shock event occurs. The ability to with-
draw SAEF funds in the form of cash is designed as an easy way for
recipients to get help covering rent in cases of emergency.
306 See supra notes 221–32 and accompanying text (discussing respondents’ stories).
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5. Annual Bonus Structure to Discourage Nonemergency Use
To provide an additional incentive to keep money in SAEF
accounts, the SAEF program would pay out annual bonuses to recipi-
ents based on the percentage of the money that remained in the
account at the time of the next year’s tax filing. The amount used for
purposes of calculating the percentage remaining in the account would
include money that rolled over from past years. Once someone has a
SAEF account, they are eligible for the bonus each year that there is
still money in their account, even if they become ineligible for the
EITC. Not including interest, my proposed bonus structure is shown
in Table 1, below.
TABLE 1
PERCENT OF BALANCE
RETAINED BONUS
100% $200
75%–99% $150
50%–74% $100
25%–49% $50
5%–24% $30
A few hypothetical examples illustrate how the bonus program
would operate. Consider a fictional mother. When she is filing fiscal
year 2017 taxes in February 2018, she has $400 in her SAEF account.
The amount deposited into her SAEF account from fiscal year 2017
taxes is $200, increasing the total amount to $600. For the purposes of
the annual bonus the next year, then, $600 is the starting amount.
Whatever percentage she has left of that $600 when she files for taxes
in 2019 will be used to calculate her bonus.
Another fictional recipient has $290 in her SAEF account from
her fiscal year 2016 taxes, filed in February 2017. She does not receive
the EITC for fiscal year 2017, but still receives a $200 bonus when she
files her taxes in 2018 because she did not withdraw any of the money.
She also earned $10 in interest the previous year, so after the $200
bonus, her account balance is now at $500. In 2019, she again does not
qualify for the EITC, but she has $250 (or 50%) remaining in her
SAEF account. She will receive a bonus based on the ratio of the $250
to her original $500. Thus, she will receive a bonus of $100.
To increase the political feasibility of the program, the bonus
dollar amounts would be set at the smallest dollar amounts for each
category thought to actually provide a real incentive that might
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change spending behavior. Further research and pilot trials on the
exact amounts to provide such an incentive may be necessary.
B. Why SAEF Accounts?
By listening to EITC recipients, I learned how the EITC actually
functions in their lives and what they believe works and does not.
What I found is that the EITC has largely replaced welfare as the
public form of support, but that because it often cannot provide
immediate help for shock events, many recipients turn to credit cards,
which provide temporary relief but long-term trouble. I sought to sug-
gest improvements based on these findings. SAEF accounts are an
answer to this problem. The program keeps the aspects of the EITC
that recipients find beneficial, but also attempts to make the program
more responsive to shock events.
Families who experience a financial shock would have stigma-free
savings from which to draw—and it would be their own money, free of
interest and finance charges. The goal of the SAEF card program
would be to make it as similar to a credit card as possible, without the
interest and fees. It would be stigma free because it would have the
appearance of a typical debit card, it would allow families to receive
money quickly if needed (unlike other government safety net pro-
grams such as unemployment insurance and disability), and it would
be readily available.307 As discussed in Part IV.B, many families
talked about keeping credit cards for emergencies only. This fund
could largely replace those cards, or at a minimum reduce the need for
them. This proposal would help families in the long term avoid
unmanageable debts and even bankruptcy. In addition, it would allow
more of the EITC in the short term to be saved or go toward mobility
goals instead of paying down interest and fees from debts that were
incurred when shock events happened throughout the year before tax
time. The amount withheld for most families would be relatively
small, but if families were able to use the $300 from their SAEF
account to pay for an emergency dental procedure rather than put this
repair on a credit card, the accumulated interest and fees they could
avoid would be significant. Then, come tax time, more of their EITC
could be used toward savings, mobility goals, or immediate needs. The
benefits for families could be tremendous.
307 Some may argue that the money would be too readily available and an incentive
beyond interest should be established to encourage recipients to only withdraw the money
in an emergency. A small withdrawal fee or additional interest incentives (increased
interest rates the longer the money is left in the account) may be advisable. During the first
few years of the program, slightly different structures such as these could be field tested
over a two- to five-year period to determine the best program structure.
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For families who do not have credit cards—or who experience a
shock event for which a credit card cannot help—the fund could have
even greater consequences. For the family that was reliant on a car to
get to work and needed a car repair but did not have access to a credit
card, the fund could mean the ability to maintain employment, thus
avoiding the potential for financial disaster and years of rebuilding.
In some cases, families may not need to access the money to help
smooth finances after a shock event, or they may only need to access
some of the money. In such cases, the SAEF account would serve as
an interest-bearing vehicle through which to save. Both respondents’
own accounts of their desire for forced savings due to the inclination
to spend money when it is given to them,308 and an abundance of
research showing that people are indeed inclined to spend money
when it is readily available,309 suggest that a forced-savings program
such as this one would be useful. People generally appreciate and
utilize forced-savings programs.310 Ultimately, over time and over sev-
eral years of EITC refunds, SAEF money could grow into a substan-
tial fund to be used for mobility purposes or for retirement if it is not
needed sooner to deal with shock events. It could serve as a down
payment on a house, a car, or even as a college fund for children.
The SAEF program would be intentionally run through the EITC
not just because the EITC is popular with recipients, but also because
it has strong bipartisan support.311 From a political feasability stand-
point, working within the EITC framework has many benefits. It is an
outlier from most public social welfare programs in the strong support
it receives.312 Congress approved many increases to the program at a
time when funding to other social welfare programs was cut or
remained stagnant.313 Thus, because the SAEF program adheres to
the basic tenets of the EITC, it is more likely to be politically feasible
than programs that resemble entitlement programs such as the pre-
1996 welfare program.
308 See supra notes 244–46 and accompanying text (discussing respondents’ preference
for forced savings).
309 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 268, at 40–52 (emphasizing the difficulties in
limiting the expenditure of available funds).
310 Id. at 48 (discussing anecdotal examples of successful forced-savings programs).
311 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
312 Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, supra note 19, at 288.
313 See id. at 285, 286 figs.1 & 2 (noting and illustrating the growth of the EITC at a time
when other social welfare programs remained stagnant or shrank).
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C. Response to Potential Counterarguments and Alternative
SAEF Designs
1. Loss of Liberty and Paternalism Given Automatic Enrollment
Structure
Some may argue that the SAEF program is paternalistic and
deprives low-income EITC recipients of money that is rightfully their
own, particularly given the automatic enrollment structure. The sim-
plest reply to this concern is that recipients can withdraw SAEF
money with no penalty. But why make families go through this extra
step? Why not simply design the program with an opt-in (or even an
opt-out) structure? The automatic enrollment approach explicitly
takes into account the belief that SAEF accounts are an important
tool for low-income families. Research suggests that people often
default to the status quo.314 If respondents were given the choice
either to go with what has been the default for many years (no SAEF
account) or to specifically enroll in the program, the take-up rates
likely would be very low. While there is mild paternalism associated
with such automatic enrollment programs, the idea is that the program
nudges people in the direction of making their lives better, while still
allowing them the choice to reject the nudge by withdrawing their
money. In their book Nudge, Professors Richard Thaler and Cass
Sunstein discuss in great detail the idea of nudging people of all
income levels in the direction of wise economic choices while still
allowing them the option to reject these choices.315 One of the impor-
tant justifications for such nudges is the wealth of research that shows
that people often make fairly bad economic decisions and that they
may make different decisions “if they [pay] full attention and pos-
sess[ ] complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and com-
plete self-control.”316 The SAEF program is designed with this
research in mind.
2. Families Cannot Afford the Twenty Percent Withheld
A related, more troubling concern is that families’ budgets may
not allow for this type of withholding. Particularly in the first year of
implementation, before they have had a chance to save up a “rainy-
day fund” from past years, families may be stretched since the EITC is
a significant part of many families’ budgets.317 Results from another
314 See supra note 300 and accompanying text.
315 See generally THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 268.
316 Id. at 5.
317 See Mendenhall et al., supra note 25, at 4 (discussing the significant role of the EITC
in the budget of low-income families).
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analysis of this data, however, provide hope that many families would
be able to keep money in their SAEF accounts. Almost half of the
sample (47%) allocated 19% of their refund toward “asset building,”
which was defined as initial savings, education, and home ownership
or improvement expenses.318
However, this critique is important, and it points to an ongoing
conversation about the need to increase EITC subsidies. While almost
half of recipients put some money toward asset building, the other
half did not, and almost all recipients put at least some of their refund
(an average of 50%) toward current consumption.319 There have been
several proposals to increase the amount of the EITC for low-income
families, with variations such as whether the maximum amount of the
credit should be tied to the official poverty guidelines, whether there
should be a limit on the number of credit-generating children for each
household, and how rapidly the credit should be phased in and out.320
It is beyond the scope of this Article and this study’s data to comment
specifically on the degree of increase (if any) that families should
receive. However, responding to calls for an increase in the amount of
the EITC321 while implementing the SAEF account option would ease
the transition for families, increase the amount allocated to SAEF
accounts, and make it more likely that families would leave money in
their SAEF accounts to grow.
An alternative way to alleviate this concern would be for the gov-
ernment to fully or partially fund SAEF accounts. The proposal for
the SAEF program is intentionally relatively low-cost since my aim is
bipartisan appeal and implementation. More money from the govern-
ment, however, would mean an even stronger safety net for families
and less concern that recipients will lack basic needs due to the with-
holding of EITC money for SAEF accounts. An alternative plan
would be to modify the SAEF program for just the first year. Under
this plan, the government would fund the 20% for SAEF accounts up
until, at most, the second year of the program. This would give recipi-
ents an initial buffer to help recover from the cycle of interest and
debt accumulation.
3. Recipients Will Withdraw the Money for Everyday Use
Some commentators may be concerned that time, money, and
effort will be put toward the design of the SAEF program, and then
318 Id. at 43 tbl.3.
319 Id. at 22, 28, 43.
320 See supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing current proposals for EITC
reform).
321 See supra Part V.B.2. (discussing proposals to increase the EITC subsidy).
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the vast majority of recipients will simply withdraw the money right
away and use it for everyday expenses, treats, or to pay off existing
debt. Essentially, these commentators would be concerned that recipi-
ents will treat the money in their SAEF account like part of their
refund—going to an ATM and withdrawing the money quickly, rather
than saving it to cover future shock events.
There are several factors that lead me to predict otherwise. First,
respondents in this study said again and again that they like forced-
savings programs. Many of them enrolled in workplace Christmas sav-
ings accounts and similar programs, if available. Additionally, one of
the reasons the EITC is so popular with respondents is precisely
because they view it as forced savings and, as discussed in Part V.B.1,
respondents much prefer the lump sum to an option like the AEITC,
which would give them money each month.
Second, behavioral economic research also supports the proposi-
tion that recipients will use the money for its intended purpose.
Research finds that people engage in what is called “mental
accounting.”322 That is, “people appear to compartmentalize wealth
and spending into distinct budget categories, such as savings, rent, and
entertainment, and into separate mental accounts, such as current
income, assets, and future income.”323 People tend to adhere to these
separate “accounts.” Thus, since SAEF accounts would be clearly
labeled as emergency accounts, people would be more likely to adhere
to this category of spending. Researchers have even suggested—based
on mental accounting research—that bank accounts could be designed
to conform to people’s mental accounting schemes. Researchers have
gone on to note that “[t]he labeling of accounts, while nonsensical
from the perspective of standard fungibility assumptions, could pro-
vide a salient reminder and help with the allocation of specific
funds.”324 Additionally, the twelve-month bonus incentive to the
SAEF program discussed above means that by withdrawing the
money for nonemergency situations, recipients would forgo the rela-
tively large bonuses they would otherwise receive if they instead left
the money in their accounts. Finally, the need to activate the card and
wait twenty-four hours to use it is likely to curb some impulsive
spending.325
However, given the easy accessibility of SAEF account money, it
is certainly possible that the lure of spending it for nonemergency pur-
poses will result in some percentage of recipients quickly draining
322 Mullainathan & Shafir, supra note 268, at 123.
323 Id. at 123–24.
324 Id. at 135.
325 See Fennell, supra note 305.
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their accounts despite incentives to the contrary. If this proves to be a
widespread problem, the program should be modified to make the
funds slightly more difficult to access. One way to provide further dis-
couragement from impulsive and nonemergency use would be for the
SAEF cards to arrive initially locked, with the need for justification
before activation. To access funds, card-holders would have to call a
financial crisis SAEF card hotline during normal business hours and
explain what they want to use the card for and how much money they
will need released. The threshold for approval would be very low, but
the additional step before use may help to curb the urge to use the
card for nonemergency expenses. Respondents would not have to pro-
vide documentation, but they would have to explain their situation to
someone and seek approval. The hotline would add some additional
administrative work (and thus disincentive for nonemergency use)
without adding too many difficult, stigmatizing administrative steps.
There is a concern that if the disincentives for use were too burden-
some or stigmatizing, people would just turn to credit cards to avoid
the hassle. I believe, however, that the justification hotline is a rela-
tively non-burdensome step, and therefore such a concern is relatively
small. Thus, such a hotline could be put into practice if necessary.
4. Why Not a Simple Savings Direct Deposit Program Through
Banks?
At first glance, it may be hard to distinguish this program from a
more straightforward direct deposit program. Why not simply
encourage EITC recipients to have some or all of their refund depos-
ited directly into a bank savings account, or have this done automati-
cally?326 Recipients would have access to this money through a debit
card, and the money would accumulate interest. Many scholars have
argued that it is important to bring low-income people into the main-
stream banking system.327 Directly depositing EITC refunds into a
326 Michael Barr advocates for EITC refunds to be directly deposited into bank savings
accounts in order to bring unbanked individuals into the banking system. Michael S. Barr,
Financial Services, Saving, and Borrowing Among Low- and Moderate-Income
Households: Evidence from the Detroit Area Household Financial Services Survey, in
INSUFFICIENT FUNDS, supra note 268, at 66, 94.
327 See, e.g., NEWMAN & CHEN, supra note 5, at 73–76 (explaining that a huge portion of
the low-income population does not use banks and discussing why it may be beneficial for
the poor to be banked); Michael S. Barr & Rebecca M. Blank, Savings, Assets, Credit, and
Banking Among Low-Income Households: Introduction and Overview, in INSUFFICIENT
FUNDS, supra note 268, at 1, 3–4 (discussing the disadvantages of not having a bank
account).
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bank account is one way to accomplish this goal.328 However, the
same scholars note that there are many risks for low-income people in
becoming involved with banks in their current form.329 High overdraft
fees and account balance minimums are just some of the challenges
low-income bank users face.330 Some authors have suggested ways to
improve and incentivize banks to better serve low-income clients,331
but these recommendations have remained largely recommendations
rather than reality, or have been applied only in pilot programs.332
Practically, a simple direct deposit may yield lower participation
rates in the SAEF program because research shows that many low-
income people do not trust banks,333 and a significant percentage
(20%–25%) are unbanked.334 Findings from this study confirm that
many respondents are wary of banks. We heard stories of respondents
leaving banks because of high overdraft fees and other unexpected
328 Mullainathan & Shafir, supra note 268, at 134–35 (explaining that “a behavioral view
would predict positive effects on saving from the opening of bank accounts” and from the
direct deposit of EITC refunds into bank accounts).
329 See, e.g., Barr, supra note 326, at 69. Barr, an advocate for having low-income house-
holds use banking, notes that change is needed to make bank accounts feasible for this
population. Id. He says, “As currently structured, the financial services system does not
work for LMI [low- and middle-income] households. Many LMI households find that
checking accounts are ill suited to their needs . . . . LMI households face a significant risk of
overdrafting their checking accounts and paying high fees.” Id. Barr goes on to note that
“[m]any LMI households have had a bank account in the past but were unable to manage
their finances to avoid overdrafts or insufficient funds fees, or they were unwilling to pay
high fees. Minimum balance requirements may also be a significant barrier for low-income
households.” Id.
330 See Barr, supra note 326, at 69 (explaining that, in addition to high overdraft fees
and account minimums, low-income bank users are often deterred by prior negative
banking experiences).
331 See, e.g., id. at 93 (proposing changes to bank accounts to make them more useful
and appealing to low-income users and recommending incentives for banks to offer these
accounts to low-income users).
332 E.g., BARR, supra note 160 (noting that the federal government has only made
“some progress” toward incentiving low-income families to save and banks to provide
helpful accounts for these families and describing a pilot program the Treasury
Department launched in 2011 in pursuit of these goals).
333 See NEWMAN & CHEN, supra note 5, at 73–74 (explaining that many low-income
immigrant families, specifically those in Washington Heights, do not trust banks). The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) estimates that approximately 20% “of
lower income U.S. households—almost 7 million households earning below $30,000 per
year—do not currently have a bank account.” See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., NATIONAL
SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLDS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4
(2009). Further, approximately 41.1% of unbanked households believe that opening a bank
account in the future is “not likely at all.” Id.
334 Michael Barr and Rebecca Blank, for example, estimate that nearly 25% of low-
income American families (those earning less than $18,900 per year) are unbanked and
that nearly 13% of moderate-income households (those earning between $18,900 and
$33,900 per year) are unbanked. See Barr & Blank, supra note 327, at 3.
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charges.335 Several respondents did not use banks but instead hid
savings in their sock drawers, home safe deposit boxes, and around
the house.336 These respondents knew they could open a bank
account, but felt that dealing with a bank was not desirable. When one
respondent was asked if she ever considered opening a savings
account, she said, “I don’t have no money to pay monthly mainte-
nance fees and I don’t want to just start swiping because you can
swipe a card with no money and you’ll get an overdraft fee. And I
don’t have it to pay. And temptation will get you.”337 Even respon-
dents who had bank accounts talked about avoiding them. One
respondent told us, “If you go over on your checking they charge
thirty-five dollars until it’s paid. . . . [I]t’s happened three or four
times.”338 After discussing these fees, she said, “That’s why I take out
all the money.”339 Further, she noted, “Anything that we can pay in
cash we’d rather do it because we’re scared to use our [debit] cards . . .
because of those overdraft fees.”340 In contrast to respondents’ per-
ceptions and suspicions of banks, respondents did not indicate suspi-
cion or fear toward the IRS (though they did not want to owe the IRS
money). This is likely because respondents in this study all received
tax refunds, rather than owing taxes, and it is unlikely any of them
ever had incomes high enough to have to pay substantial federal
income taxes at tax time. For them, tax time is when they get a wind-
fall payment, not a time that they owe money—and this windfall
comes from the IRS.
Respondents’ suspicious attitudes about banks are not entirely
unfounded. Banks often have hidden fees, account minimums, and
335 Michael Barr finds similar trends in his Detroit-area research. See Barr, supra note
326, at 69 (noting that many low-income families were previously banked but could not
handle or did not want to pay the associated fees, and thus left the banking system
altogether).
336 E.g., Interview with Respondent 24 (Aug. 30, 2007) (“I just keep [savings] here in the
house. . . . my money’s stashed everywhere. It’s never in the same spot.”); Interview with
Respondent 55 (Aug. 18, 2007) (“I took everything out [of the bank]. I do have some cash.
It’s just like I don’t want to put any money in the savings.”); Interview with Respondent 61
(July 19, 2007) (“Maybe if I could like, I’m giving my money, I’m giving half to my husband
to put in the safe, we’ve got a safe.”); Interview with Respondent 102 (July 29, 2007)
(“Yeah, . . . I keep [savings] in my wallet and they know not to go in my wallet.”);
Interview with Respondent 172 (Aug. 27, 2007) (“I’ve been trying here lately to take some
of my monies that I’ve earned . . . and trying to put some of it away in my sock
drawer. . . .”).
337 Interview with Respondent 86 (Oct. 11, 2007).
338 Interview with Respondent 27 (July 24, 2007).
339 Id.
340 Id.
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charges when accounts go below a certain amount.341 The IRS could
attempt to negotiate with banks to make certain types of accounts
available for SAEF account purposes that would avoid such problems,
but the negotiations and resulting details would be complex.
Recipients would remain vulnerable to hidden fees, bank mergers,
bank closings, and a tangled web of negotiation between their bank
and the IRS whenever a problem with an account occurred.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the SAEF accounts go
beyond simple savings accounts. While the goal of encouraging low-
income families to be banked may be important, that is not the goal of
this proposal. The SAEF program is specifically intended to help pro-
vide EITC recipients with a financial cushion in the case of emergen-
cies and to help avoid credit card use or immediate financial disaster.
As discussed in Part VI.C.3, behavioral economic research shows that
people engage in mental accounting, and therefore, labeling money
for specific uses can make a difference in how individuals think about
and use that money.342 This program would nudge people toward
saving specifically for an emergency fund. Even including the words
“savings” and “emergency” in the name of the program could steer
recipients in the right direction—toward savings with a plan to only
use the SAEF funds in emergencies. The idea is that this fund would
be viewed as a special government savings and emergency fund
intended for just those purposes rather than a typical bank savings
account.
5. Savings Should Go to Asset Building and Long-Term Mobility
Goals
The SAEF program may appear to be a band-aid approach. Some
may argue that instead of a savings program focused on smoothing
shock events, savings for the poor should be focused on long-term
asset accumulation and mobility goals.
Professor Michael Sherraden’s individual development accounts
(IDA) provide an example of a program that aims to aid long-term
asset accumulation and mobility, specifically by providing matched
savings. Thus far, IDAs have been implemented in the form of short-
term demonstration projects.343 Allowed uses of IDA savings are usu-
ally homeownership, education, and small business capitalization, and
341 See NEWMAN & CHEN, supra note 5, at 74–75 (noting the shortcomings of traditional
bank accounts for the poor); Barr, supra note 326, at 69 (explaining how traditional bank
accounts provide barriers to use for low-income users).
342 See supra notes 322–24 and accompanying text (discussing mental accounting).
343 See Michael Sherraden, Individual Development Accounts and Asset-Building Policy:
Lessons and Directions, in INSUFFICIENT FUNDS, supra note 268, at 191–93.
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in some cases cars and computers.344 The program also requires finan-
cial education tailored to the specific goal of the savings account.345
The goal of asset building is an important one, and having savings
earmarked for mobility goals can motivate respondents to work
harder toward these goals. Indeed, Sherraden found that IDAs
provide motivation and goals, incentivizing holders to save more and
plan for the future.346
The SAEF program does not run counter to asset and mobility
programs such as IDAs, but instead should serve as a complement to
these programs. A qualitative study of IDA account holders found
that many participants made “unapproved withdrawals,” thus giving
up the matching funds until the money was replaced.347 Researchers
presume these withdrawls were made for acute short-term pur-
poses.348 If EITC recipients had SAEF accounts mentally earmarked
for emergency funds, they would be more likely to withdraw only
emergency funds from the SAEF account and thus would be more
likely to be able to keep money in long-term savings accounts.
Without SAEF funds, so many EITC recipients experience shock
events requiring immediate money that it is not surprising Sherraden
found that many IDA holders withdrew money from IDAs for unap-
proved purposes. Thus, SAEF accounts would serve not only to help
low-income families maintain stability in the short term, but they may
also contribute to longer term mobility by allowing money in long-
term savings accounts to remain undisturbed.
D. Implementation Concerns for SAEF Accounts
Several important implementation issues would have to be
resolved before the SAEF program could be fully established. First,
there would certainly be administrative costs associated with the pro-
gram since both additional staffing and improvements to IRS infra-
structure are necessary to ensure its smooth operation. The main
administrative costs would consist of hiring or transferring people to
administer and oversee the program, creating a computer and record-
keeping infrastructure that accurately tracks and updates SAEF
accounts, and the general costs of administering SAEF cards and
accounts. Additionally, because SAEF accounts would earn interest,
344 See id. at 193 (listing the typical uses of IDA savings).
345 See id.
346 Id. at 197 (noting that IDA participants explained that the IDA “provides a ‘road
map’ and a ‘way to reach goals’” and that it made them “‘more able to save,’ ‘look forward
to saving,’ and ‘plan to save in the future’”).
347 Id.
348 Id.
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there may be some cost associated with payment of this interest,
though the IRS may be able to meet or exceed the guaranteed interest
through its own investment of the money. The matching program and
annual bonus program would require additional funding. In the long
term, however, the SAEF program would likely save the government
money because it has the potential to keep scores of low-income
people from needing even more costly government resources, such as
welfare or the service of homeless shelters. Additionally, the matching
program and annual bonus program could be eliminated if budget
constraints and political feasibility so dictated.
There is no doubt that the IRS’s capacity would be stretched, but
the IRS could look to programs such as SNAP—which provides debit-
like cards that are reloaded each month—for implementation gui-
dance. Additional administrative attention would have to be paid to,
for example, administering the cards, dealing with lost cards, and
avoiding fraud.
Another implementation concern may be that SAEF would
require the IRS to function like a social welfare agency. While this
program will certainly require the IRS to undertake extra administra-
tive steps, it is important to keep the program within the IRS rather
than run it through a social welfare agency. As Steve Holt notes,
“[m]ost EITC recipients are not now clients of social welfare agen-
cies,” and they do not want to be clients of these offices.349 Running
this program through welfare offices would be an automatic deterrent
to most EITC recipients. As discussed in Part III, money received
through such offices is riddled with negative stereotypes and stigma,
even among recipients. Furthermore, “[t]he enforcement-centered
approach of traditional benefits programs runs counter to the self-
determinative, voluntary compliance character of the tax system and
would unreasonably differentiate EITC recipients.”350 Social welfare
offices are not experts in the tax code, so there could be confusion and
administrative difficulties associated with running a program that
depends on a recipient’s tax return amount through these offices.
A related administrative concern is that the SAEF program
forces the IRS to act as a bank. There are strong reasons to avoid
banks taking over SAEF accounts, as discussed in Part VI.C.4. If the
administrative capacity of the IRS proved unable to fully manage the
SAEF program, however, the IRS could consider contracting with a
349 Holt, supra note 258, at 29 (advocating to keep the EITC within the IRS and out of
social welfare offices); see also supra Part III (exploring EITC recipients’ overwhelmingly
positive responses to the EITC and contrasting these with their overwhelmingly negative
responses to welfare).
350 HOLT, supra note 99, at 29.
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bank to help administer certain aspects of the program (in the same
way some states contract with J.P. Morgan to administer SNAP
accounts through electronic benefit cards). However, this option
should occur only as a partnership between the IRS and a bank, rather
than as a complete takeover of the program. The IRS should always
remain the contact point for recipients.351
CONCLUSION
As more Americans become income-insecure, the demand for the
public safety net continues to increase. There is agreement that the
EITC plays a central role in that safety net, but the strength of the net
for the poorest working Americans is debated. Congress has held
numerous hearings and solicited expert advice about the transition
from traditional welfare to work-based programs such as the EITC. In
all of these conversations, one critical voice has been largely absent—
that of the recipients. Similarly, legal academics have been debating
the merits, design, and purpose of the EITC with few empirical studies
as a basis for this commentary.
This study takes an important step toward incorporating what I
learned from recipients about their financial lives into an evaluation
of the EITC and a proposal for change. By using established sociolog-
ical methods to collect and analyze the data, my findings highlight
both the advantages and disadvantages of the EITC for recipients.
The EITC is a popular program, and it is an essential part of many
families’ budgets. Further, it motivates recipients to work and allows
them to make progress toward mobility goals. However, the EITC
fails to provide support for families when they experience untimely
financial shocks. As welfare has become less available both from a
structural and from a cultural or psychological point of view, families
either use credit cards as a buffer and then later find themselves in a
mess of unmanageable debt from accumulated interest and fees, or
they experience an immediate downward spiral that leaves them with
a financial mess that takes years to clean up. As financial insecurity
leads more families to seek out a public safety net for support, an
epidemic of new bankruptcy filings and homeless families may be on
the horizon unless change is made. My proposed SAEF accounts are
one way to help avoid such an epidemic.
351 See supra notes 333–40 and accompanying text (explaining that many low-income
individuals have a deep suspicion of banks and a more positive view of the IRS).
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 1: DEMOGRAPHICS OF SAMPLE
BOSTON CHAMPAIGN-URBANA
STANDARD STANDARD
PROPORTION ERROR PROPORTION ERROR
Race/Ethnicity
Black .35 (.04) .58 (.06)
White .35 (.04) .42 (.06)
Latino .30 (.04) N/A N/A
Married .39 (.05) .43 (.06)
Work Status
Full Time .47 (.05) .49 (.06)
Part Time .36 (.05) .26 (.05)
Combined Full & Part Time .17 (.04) .25 (.05)
Education
Less than High School .14 (.03) .04 (.02)
High School/GED .14 (.03) .22 (.05)
Some College .35 (.05) .30 (.05)
Associate’s Degree .25 (.04) .35 (.06)
Bachelor’s Degree .11 (.03) .07 (.03)
Post-Bachelor’s Degree .01 (.01) .07 (.03)
Immigrant .35 (.04) .05 (.02)
Total Back Debt $7506 ($1106) $11,408 ($3279)
Tax Refund $4686 ($162) $3640 ($181)
Household Earnings $24,281 ($1421) $21,672 ($1671)
Household Earnings & $27,781 ($1339) $25,570 ($1551)
Government Assistance
Sample Size 115 79
